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The Supreme Court’s Post-9/11 
War-on-Terror Jurisprudence 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS, THRESHOLD 
DETERMINATIONS, AND ANTICIPATORY REVIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
Should a federal court ever overlook traditional 
jurisdictional requirements in determining whether to review 
on the merits a federal habeas challenge waged by an alleged 
enemy combatant detained in the midst of the so-called war  
on terror? What if extraordinary, exceptional, or unique 
circumstances surround such a detainee challenge?1 What if 
the challenge epitomizes a profound debate between personal 
liberty and national security or otherwise invokes a significant 
public interest?2 What if an executive actor has overseen the 
military detention of an alleged combatant (perhaps an 
American citizen) to an unprecedented extent and has even 
caused the removal of this person from the civilian justice 
system?3 What if this detainee denied all wrongdoing but has 
been held without access to counsel or meaningful judicial 
access for two years?4 Three years? Four years? What if the 
detainee has been held not in the United States itself, but in a 
territory controlled by the United States for all practical 
  
 1 See infra Part I.A-B. Within this Note, the term “detainee challenge” refers 
generally to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus raised by or on behalf of a person or 
group of persons detained militarily by the federal government.  
 2 See infra Part I.A-B; see also infra Part I.D. 
 3 See infra Part I.A. 
 4 See infra Part I.B; see also infra Part I.D. 
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purposes?5 Are any of these scenarios special enough to justify 
immediate review of the corresponding claims? 
A closely related issue is whether a court should review 
on the merits a detainee challenge, or elements therein, that is 
based on reasonably foreseeable but only partially developed 
circumstances.6 One possible future scenario is perpetual (that 
is, effectively lifelong) detention given that the war on terror 
has no foreseeable endpoint and could potentially span 
multiple generations.7 Another, more immediate, prospect 
relates to the trial of detainees by Executive-established 
military commissions that may implement illegal procedures or 
that are minimally subject to judicial review by Article III (that 
is, civilian) courts.8 The question thus becomes whether courts 
should expedite review to accommodate these hypothetical 
(though anticipatable) controversies due to the major personal 
liberties and constitutional issues at stake.9 Or, should courts 
instead take more of a wait-and-see approach to delay 
addressing arguably novel legal issues or unprecedented 
factual scenarios until they are concretely presented?10 
This Note will examine these two groups of questions as 
they pertain to the four war-on-terror detainee challenges 
heard by the U.S. Supreme Court in the five years following 
September 11, 2001. These cases are Rumsfeld v. Padilla,11 
Rasul v. Bush,12 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,13 and Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld.14 Padilla (in particular) and Hamdi (to a more 
  
 5 See infra Part I.B.  
 6 See infra Part I.C-D.  
 7 See infra Part I.C; infra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra Part I.D. 
 9 See infra Part I.D; see also infra Part I.A, C. 
 10 See infra Part I.C-D. 
 11 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
 12 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 13  542 U.S. 507 (2004). Note that Padilla, Rasul, and Hamdi were all decided 
on June 28, 2004. In light of this, it may be appropriate to refer to them as sister cases, 
even if they often do not see eye to eye. This Note will chronologically order and refer to 
them per their placements in the Supreme Court Reporter. This is mostly a matter of 
convenience, for there does not appear to be a necessary, definitive ordering of these 
cases for purposes of the Supreme Court’s post-9/11, war-on-terror jurisprudence. But 
the fact that these cases were decided on the same day underscores their 
inconsistencies as a group in that these inconsistencies cannot be explained away by 
virtue of being decided at different times. 
 14 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). It appears that Boumediene v. Bush will be the fifth 
case in this line. See infra note 104. Oral arguments have started in this case, but a 
decision may not be handed down for some time. See id. 
  This Note acknowledges from the outset that there are far too many issues 
related to these cases (and, more generally, the legal implications of the war on terror) 
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qualified extent) advocate for judicial restraint in response to 
questions such as those posed above, thereby supporting 
resolution of threshold issues in accordance with narrow, 
readily accessible criteria.15 By contrast, Rasul and Hamdan,  
at least implicitly, prove more willing to consider less tangible 
factors, including the relative equities of a habeas challenge,  
in determining whether to review such cases on their merits.16 
This Note will seek to show that these discrepancies contribute 
to an unreliable and unstable line of precedent in the Court’s 
post-9/11 war-on-terror jurisprudence and that this effect 
exacerbates the political and judicial contention already 
consuming the subject. 
This Note will further criticize the Court’s emerging 
tendency,17 as evidenced by Rasul and Hamdan, to incorporate 
indirectly the merits of a detainee challenge, including any 
arguably unusual underlying or surrounding circumstances, 
within a jurisdictional or other threshold determination.18  
More specifically, in these cases, the Court invoked the 
purportedly extraordinary nature of the respective detainee 
challenges in order to reinforce, justify, or defend purportedly 
strict, formal threshold determinations prerequisite to a  
review on the merits.19 The merits of these cases, as such, 
appeared to creep into preliminary determinations of whether 
to review these very same merits, but without any clear or 
meaningful delineation. In addition to this conflation of 
substantive attributes and threshold determinations, the 
structure and content of these opinions makes it difficult to 
determine whether certain, seemingly merits-based conclusions 
functioned only as dicta (that is, additional non-binding  
points) or were effectively collapsed into the primary threshold 
  
for this Note to discuss in depth or even address at all. Not surprisingly, there already 
is a substantial body of “war-on-terror” scholarship, entailing a wide variety of 
approaches and opinions. Alas, due to practical constraints, this Note will only be able 
to cite a small slice of this literature.  
 15 See infra Parts II.A, III.A. For an explanation of the parenthetical 
qualification regarding Hamdi, see infra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra Parts II.B.2-3, III.B.2.a-b. 
 17 But, at the same time, this Note still recognizes the overall instability of 
these detainee cases as a group. 
 18 See infra Parts II.B, III.B.  
 19 See infra Parts II.B, III.B.  In a related manner, Hamdan also exemplifies 
an inclination to apply a relatively expansive temporal vantage point to resolving 
detainee challenges when the treatment of detainees implicates substantial liberty 
interests or raises far-reaching legal questions. See infra Part III.B. 
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analyses.20 These overlapping characteristics may be identified 
respectively as merits-creep and dicta-creep.21 
Part I of this Note will provide an overview of the four 
detainee challenges heard by the Supreme Court since 9/11.22 
Part II will discuss in detail Padilla and Rasul regarding 
whether (or to what extent) a federal court should consider the 
merits or exceptional features of a detainee challenge in 
assessing jurisdiction. Part II will also compare these cases to 
Hamdi and Hamdan in relation to how narrowly or 
expansively threshold issues should be reviewed. Part III, 
which will elaborate more on Hamdi and Hamdan, will 
examine whether federal courts should review claims premised 
on circumstances that are still forming but are reasonably 
  
 20 See infra Parts II.B.2-3, III.B.2.a-b. For an expanded discussion on dicta, 
see Hon. Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249 (2006). According to Judge Leval:  
[D]icta often serve extremely valuable purposes. They can help clarify a 
complicated subject. They can assist future courts to reach sensible, well-
reasoned results. They can help lawyers and society to predict the future 
course of the court’s rulings. They can guide future courts to adopt fair and 
efficient procedures. What is problematic is not the utterance of dicta, but the 
failure to distinguish between holding and dictum. 
Id. at 1253. Leval, in short, advocates for the “careful use of dictum in judicial 
opinions.” Id. (emphasis added). For an example of a federal case taking to heart 
Leval’s “dicta about dicta,” by clearly delineating between holding and dictum, see Fox 
TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 462 n.12. (2d Cir. 2007) (“We recognize that 
what follows is dicta . . . .”) (discussing potential constitutional challenges to the FCC 
indecency regime after invalidating it on administrative grounds). Interestingly, Leval 
wrote a dissenting opinion in this case in which he “express[ed] neither agreement nor 
disagreement with [the court’s] added discussion,” and noted that “the respect accorded 
to dictum depends on its persuasive force and not on the fact that it appears in a court 
opinion.” Id. at 474 n.19 (Leval, J., dissenting). 
 21 These terms are used to describe trends in the war-on-terror jurisprudence 
that are otherwise difficult to articulate concisely; perhaps they should not be regarded 
as having independent significance. The author is unaware of other instances where 
these exact terms have been used. 
  Newt Gingrich, former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, 
explored the notion of “creep” in a very different sense, but also within the context of 
national security and the war on terror. See Newt Gingrich, The Policies of War; 
Refocus the Mission, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 18, 2003, available at http://www.newt.org/ 
backpage.asp?art=993 (“Congress must act now to rein in the Patriot Act, limit its use 
to national security concerns and prevent it from developing ‘mission creep’ into areas 
outside of national security.” (referring to Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 
(“USA PATRIOT Act”), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)) (emphasis added)). 
Mission creep is defined by one dictionary as “the gradual process by which a campaign 
or mission’s objectives change over time, esp. with undesirable consequences.” See 
Webster’s New Millennium Dictionary of English, Preview Edition (v 0.9.7 2008), 
available at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Mission%20creep (last visited Oct. 
10, 2007). 
 22  See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text. 
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likely to come to pass in the future.23 Part IV will conclude that 
the Court should reverse the overreaching course set by Rasul 
and Hamdan due to the difficulties intrinsic to determining 
what constitutes special circumstances, let alone whether such 
circumstances are special enough to justify departure from 
basic threshold rules. 
I. THE POST-9/11 DETAINEE CHALLENGES: FACTS AND 
HOLDINGS 
Since 9/11, the Supreme Court has heard four federal 
habeas petitions raised by alleged enemy combatants detained 
outside of the civilian criminal system in the context of the war 
on terror.24 These cases entail various factual scenarios: an 
American citizen captured on U.S. soil and detained in the 
United States;25 an American citizen captured in Afghanistan 
following the American invasion there in October 2001 and 
subsequently detained in the United States;26 and non-citizens 
captured in Afghanistan and detained at the Guantanamo Bay 
Naval Brig.27 The detainees in these cases challenged either the 
circumstances of their confinement or the nature of the judicial 
process they received or were set to receive.28 From these four 
cases emerged an inconsistent line of precedent with regard to 
the appropriate connection between the substantive attributes 
of a detainee challenge and threshold determinations as well as 
the scope of review warranted under the various circumstances 
of these cases. 
  
 23 Part III will link to Part II to the extent that the decision to prospectively 
analyze a detainee challenge turns on the merits of that case or the personal liberties 
at stake. 
 24 See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text. 
 25 Padilla, 542 U.S. at 430-31. 
 26 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510. 
 27 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470-71.  
 28 The Court, however, directly reviewed the merits of only two of these 
challenges: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. See infra Part I.C & I.D. By 
contrast, Padilla v. Rumsfeld dealt exclusively with jurisdictional issues, see infra Part 
I.A, as did Rasul v. Bush, at least as a formal matter. See infra Part I.B. 
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A. Rumsfeld v. Padilla: The First Post-9/11 Detainee 
Challenge 
In Rumsfeld v. Padilla29 (unlike in Rasul v. Bush30 or 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld31), the Court explicitly declined to 
consider the special circumstances surrounding a detainee 
challenge in determining whether the detainee had satisfied 
threshold requirements necessary to its review of the merits.32 
Stated differently, the Court refused to overlook traditional 
jurisdictional requirements to address the profound debate 
between national security and personal liberties (potentially) 
presented by this challenge.33 Instead, the Court proceeded to 
review threshold issues on a narrow level and to assign the 
greatest legal relevance to readily accessible facts and 
circumstances.34 
1. The Facts of Rumsfeld v. Padilla 
Jose Padilla, an American citizen, allegedly conspired 
with al Qaeda in Afghanistan to execute terrorist attacks 
against the United States.35 In May 2002, federal agents 
detained Padilla at Chicago O’Hare International Airport after 
he flew in from Pakistan.36 Padilla initially was held in federal 
criminal custody in the Southern District of New York.37 
Subsequently, pursuant to a presidential order stating that 
Padilla was an enemy combatant,38 he was taken into custody 
by the Department of Defense and relocated to a naval brig in 
  
 29 542 U.S. 426 (2004).  
 30 See infra Part I.B. 
 31 See infra Part I.C. 
 32 See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 447-51. 
 33 See id. at 450-51. 
 34 See infra Part II.A. 
 35 Padilla, 542 U.S. at 430-31.  
 36 Id. at 430. 
 37 Id. at 431. 
 38 Presidential Order to The Secretary of Defense (June 9, 2002). In making 
this order, the President relied in part on the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
Joint Resolution (“AUMF”). See id. (referring to Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(authorizing the President “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such 
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism 
against the United States . . . .” )). 
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South Carolina under the oversight of Commander Melanie 
Marr.39 
Two days after Padilla was relocated, Padilla’s counsel 
filed a federal habeas petition on his behalf in the Southern 
District of New York, naming as custodians Secretary of State 
Donald Rumsfeld, Commander Marr, and President George W. 
Bush.40 The petition alleged that Padilla’s detention violated 
several constitutional provisions, including the Sixth Amend-
ment and the Suspension Clause.41 
2. The Holdings of the Padilla Court 
Reversing the lower courts, a majority of the Padilla 
Court held that, in accordance with traditional habeas 
jurisdictional requirements, Padilla’s (proper) immediate 
custodian was Commander Marr, not Secretary Rumsfeld, and 
the Southern District of New York did not have jurisdiction 
over Marr.42 As a result, the Southern District lacked 
  
 39 Padilla, 542 U.S. at 431-32. 
 40 Id. at 432. Early in the litigation, the District Court, Southern District of 
New York, dismissed President Bush as a respondent. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. 
Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he President should be dismissed 
as a party [because] Padilla does not seem to be seeking relief from the President” and 
because “the question of whether the President can be sued in this case raises issues 
this court should avoid if at all possible, and it is certainly possible to avoid them 
here.”). It does not appear that this ruling was challenged by any party to this case.  
 41 Padilla, 542 U.S. at 432. The district court had held that Secretary 
Rumsfeld, but not Commander Marr, was the proper respondent, Padilla, F. Supp. 2d 
at 578, and that the court had jurisdiction over Rumsfeld via New York’s long-arm 
statute. Id. at 587. But on the merits the court held that the President had authority to 
detain as enemy combatants American citizens captured in the United States. Id. at 
587-89. The Court of Appeals, Second Circuit affirmed the jurisdictional holdings of the 
district court, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 724 (2d Cir. 2003), but ruled that the 
President was not authorized to detain Padilla militarily on either a statutory or 
constitutional basis. Id.  
 42 The Court identified a pair of jurisdictional requirements that it deemed 
controlling in this case: the “immediate custodian” and “district of confinement” rules. 
Id. at 435-36, 442; see also infra note 45. The immediate custodian rule requires that a 
habeas petitioner name as his custodian the “warden of the facility where the prisoner 
is being held, not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official.” 
Padilla, 542 U.S. at 434-35 (citing Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885) 
(interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2242(a) (stating that “the person who has custody” over the 
petitioner is the proper respondent))). Notwithstanding any personal involvement 
Secretary of State Rumsfeld may have had in the removal of Padilla from the civilian 
criminal system and relocation to a military facility, Rumsfeld did not qualify as the 
immediate custodian. Id. at 441-42. Commander Marr, not Rumsfeld, directly oversaw 
the military brig where Padilla was detained and therefore was the proper respondent 
in this case. Id. at 436.  
  The district of confinement rule, the second jurisdictional requirement, 
simply requires that the petitioner file his habeas challenge in the district where he 
was confined at the time of filing. Id. at 442 (citing Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 
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jurisdiction over Padilla’s habeas challenge.43 The Court 
therefore declined to review the merits of the case and 
remanded for dismissal, but without prejudice.44 
  
611, 617 (1961) (interpreting the phase “within their respective jurisdictions” to mean 
that habeas relief may only be granted in the district in which the petitioner is 
confined (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)))). Padilla’s petition did not satisfy this rule, 
because it had been filed in the Southern District after, not before, the removal of 
Padilla from this district. See id. at 432, 445. Although the Court had previously 
interpreted the habeas statute as requiring “nothing more than that the court issuing 
the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian,” id. at 442 (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial 
Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973)), in core habeas cases such as this, see 
infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text, “the district of confinement [was] 
synonymous with the district court that ha[d] territorial jurisdiction over the proper 
respondent.” Padilla, 542 U.S. at 444. Padilla, in other words, should have filed in 
South Carolina, where both he and his immediate custodian (the proper respondent) 
were located. See id. at 446.  
 43 Padilla, 542 U.S. at 451. 
 44 Id. at 430, 451. Justice Stevens dissented, see infra note 145, and Justice 
Kennedy, in a relatively brief concurrence, explained why the Court should have 
focused on “personal jurisdiction or venue” in resolving the dispute. Padilla, 542 U.S. 
at 451-52 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
  Subsequent to this decision, Padilla filed a habeas petition in the District 
Court, District of South Carolina. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678 (D. S.C. 2005), 
rev’d, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006). The district court 
granted the petition on February 28, 2005, id. at 692, but the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit reversed, Padilla v. Hanft 423 F.3d 386, 389 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. 
denied, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006), holding that the government could indefinitely detain 
Padilla militarily as an enemy combatant pursuant to the AUMF. Id. at 389, 392 
(Padilla’s “military detention as an enemy combatant by the President is 
unquestionably authorized by the AUMF as a fundamental incident to the President’s 
prosecution of the war against al Qaeda in Afghanistan,” considering that Padilla “took 
up arms on behalf of [al Qaeda] and against our country . . . and . . . thereafter traveled 
to the United States for the avowed purpose of further prosecuting that war on 
American soil . . . .”); see also Ronald D. Rotunda, The Detainee Cases of 2004 and 2006 
and Their Aftermath, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 21-28 (2006) (discussing hypothetically 
how the Supreme Court would have approached the merits of Padilla in light of the 
plurality opinion in Hamdi).  
  On November 22, 2005, the federal government finally brought charges 
against Padilla—including conspiracy to murder—and transferred him from military to 
civilian custody. CNN-Law Center, Terror Suspect Padilla charged, CNN.com, Nov. 22, 
2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/11/22/padilla.case/index.html. See Robert M. 
Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of 
Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 470-71 (2007) (discussing how 
allegations of Padilla in civilian context lacked the “dramatic” edge of those raised 
during Padilla’s military confinement); see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld: the Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 92 (2006) (noting 
that the indictment against Padilla was viewed as an affront against federal courts); 
Fred Barbash, Padilla’s Lawyers Suggest Indictment Helps Government Avoid Court 
Fight, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/22/AR2005112201061.html (discussing the judicial 
avoidance strategy of the government, considering that the timing of the indictment 
was just days before the government was scheduled to reply to Padilla’s Supreme Court 
appeal); supra note 39. Previously, Padilla had petitioned for writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court to challenge the ruling of the Fourth Circuit, see Padilla, 423 F.3d at 
389, but the Court denied his petition in light of the intervening events described 
above. See Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1063-64 (2006). Padilla’s claims, in short, 
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In arriving at this holding, the Court emphasized that 
the immediate custodian and district of confinement rules were 
defaults applicable to typical habeas petitions like Padilla’s, 
which challenged present physical custody within the United 
States.45 The Court focused on whether basic jurisdictional 
rules applied based on the presence of “core” circumstances, 
especially present physical confinement, as opposed to the 
absence of any arguably unusual circumstances.46 It therefore 
found that the core nature of Padilla’s petition remained intact 
despite any unique characteristics of Padilla’s confinement.47 In 
sum, at least for threshold jurisdictional purposes, a habeas 
petition involving an American citizen detained militarily as 
part of the war on terror could be described as “typical.”48 
B.  Rasul v. Bush: The Second Post-9/11 Detainee 
Challenge 
In Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme Court diverged from the 
principle espoused in Rumsfeld v. Padilla that special 
circumstances should not affect the jurisdictional standing of 
habeas petitioners, even those alleged to be enemy 
combatants.49 In a manner somewhat comparable to the 
majority in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,50 the Rasul Court appeared 
to condone invoking the merits of a detainee challenge to 
reinforce and justify formal threshold conclusions.51 Rasul thus 
  
rested on a presently hypothetical state of affairs. See infra note 186. A federal jury 
trial commenced in May 2007, MiamiHerald.com, Timeline: The Jose Padilla Case, 
http://www.miamiherald.com/multimedia/news/padilla/ (follow “2007” hyperlink) (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2007), and on August 16, 2007, Padilla was convicted of terrorism-
related conspiracy charges “after little more than a day of [jury] deliberation.”  
Abby Goodnough & Scott Shane, Padilla Is Guilty on All Charges in Terror Trial,  
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/17/us/ 
17padilla.html. Padilla is scheduled to be sentenced in January 2008. Jay Weaver, 
Padilla Sentencing Hearing Postponed, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 4, 2007. 
 45 See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 446-47; see also supra note 42 and accompanying 
text. The immediate custodian and district of confinement rules, according to the 
Court, together “compose[d] a simple rule” that “[w]henever a § 2241 habeas petitioner 
[even one held in military detention] seeks to challenge his present physical custody 
within the United States, he should name his warden as respondent and file the 
petition in the district of confinement.” Padilla, 542 U.S. at 447 (referring to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241).  
 46 Padilla, 542 U.S. at 449-50. 
 47 Id. at 441-42. 
 48 See id. at 451. 
 49 See supra notes 45-48. 
 50 See infra Part III.B.2.a-b. 
 51 See infra Part II.B. 
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introduced confusion to the Court’s post-9/11 war-on-terror 
jurisprudence regarding the appropriate degree of separation 
between threshold determinations and the substantive 
attributes of a detainee challenge. 
1. The Facts of Rasul v. Bush 
Rasul involved the consolidated claims of two 
Australian and twelve Kuwaiti citizens who allegedly fought 
alongside the Taliban following the U.S. invasion of 
Afghanistan in October 2001 and who were captured during 
related hostilities.52 From early 2002, the U.S. military held 
these fourteen persons at the Guantanamo Bay naval base, 
along with over 600 other non-Americans captured abroad.53 
The Rasul detainees, all of whom denied any connection 
to the Taliban or involvement in terrorist activity, were not 
charged with any crimes or provided with access to counsel.54 
They filed habeas petitions in the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia, seeking various forms of relief 
ranging from release from custody to access to the judicial 
process.55 The district court dismissed these claims for want of 
jurisdiction,56 and the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit affirmed.57 
2. The Holding of the Rasul Court 
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, holding 
that federal district courts have jurisdiction over habeas 
petitions raised by non-citizens captured abroad and detained 
at Guantanamo Bay58 per the applicable federal habeas 
  
 52 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470-71 (2004).  
 53 Id. at 471.  
 54 Id. at 471-72. 
 55 Id. at 472-73. 
 56 Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 68 (D.D.C. 2002) (“aliens detained 
outside the sovereign territory of the United States” may not “petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus” (referring to Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950))).  
 57 Al Odah v. U.S., 321 F.3d 1134, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Under Eisentrager, 
“ ‘the privilege of litigation’ does not extend to aliens in military custody who have no 
presence in ‘any territory over which the United States is sovereign.’” (citing Johnson 
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777-78 (1950))).  
 58 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483-84. This decision has been riddled with controversy 
with regards to proper interpretation and scope of application. The text accompanying 
this footnote presents one, but not the only, plausible reading of the majority opinion of 
Rasul. See supra Part II.B. As described in one article, the Rasul Court “failed to make 
clear whether its rationale was limited to Guantanamo Bay or instead implied that 
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statute59 and in light of relevant Supreme Court precedent 
interpreting this statute.60 The Court remanded the case to the 
district court for review on the merits.61 
In its analysis, the Court first noted that the 
circumstances of confinement in this case were distinguishable 
“in important respects” from those in Johnson v. Eisentrager, a 
  
federal habeas jurisdiction existed to review the detention of noncitizens held by the 
United States anywhere in the world.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, 
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 2029, 2058 (2007); see also John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 573, 589 
(2006) (“Rasul leaves unclear . . . whether judicial review would apply beyond Cuba” to 
the likes of “Saddam Hussein” and “Osama bin Laden.”). Justice Kennedy, in his 
concurrence, assumed the more expansive application, see supra note 168, as did 
Justice Scalia in his dissent. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“federal 
courts will entertain petitions from these prisoners . . . around the world, challenging 
actions and events far away . . . .”); see also Joseph R. Pope, The Lasting Viability of 
Rasul in the Wake of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 21, 27 
(2006) (agreeing with Scalia’s dissent, considering that American jurisdiction and 
control “necessarily” extends to territories where the military detains persons).  
 59 See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000). 
 60 See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.  
 61 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485. Justice Scalia scathingly dissented, see infra note 
58; see also infra note 168, and Justice Kennedy concurred, offering an alternative 
approach, see infra note 168.  
  In response to the majority holding, Congress passed, and the President 
signed into law on December 30, 2005, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (“DTA”), 
Pub. L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 801 and 28 
U.S.C. § 2241). The DTA effectively precluded federal review of habeas challenges “by 
alien[s] detained . . . at Guantanamo Bay.” See DTA, § 1005(e)(1) (“Except as provided 
in section 1005 of the [DTA], no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or 
consider[] (1) an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien 
detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; or (2) any other 
action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention by 
the Department of Defense of an alien at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who[] (A) is 
currently in military custody; or (B) has been determined by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in accordance with the procedures set forth 
in section 1005(e) of the [DTA] to have been properly detained as an enemy 
combatant.”); see also Pope, supra note 58, at 27 (discussing history and implications of 
DTA). This can be viewed as a significant retrenchment of federal judicial power in 
favor of the Executive branch. See Elizabeth Starrs, Protect Habeas Corpus, DENVER 
POST, April 29, 2007, at E-O1 (explaining that “Congress tried to circumvent [Rasul] by 
passing the [DTA],” but noting that “[l]egislation designed to reinstate the right of 
habeas corpus for Guantanamo Bay detainees is currently” under consideration.). 
“However,” as emphasized by Pope, the DTA “failed to address the broader implications 
of Rasul, which would allow federal courts to entertain habeas petitions brought by 
detainees held in other theaters of the conflict.” Pope, supra note 58, at 24, 33-34 
(opining that “Rasul’s imperfect holding opened a Pandora’s box Congress has failed to 
close, leaving a great deal of uncertainty in an area where certainty is needed” and 
suggesting that Congress “act quickly . . . . [to] draft legislation stripping the federal 
courts of habeas jurisdiction over all detainees captured and held in territories outside 
the United States,” so as “to more fully remediate the infirmities caused by Rasul.”). 
Also, Congress failed to explicitly apply the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the DTA 
retroactively to pending cases (such as Hamdan v. Rumsfeld). See supra note 104 and 
accompanying text. But this shortcoming has apparently been fixed through 
subsequent legislation. See id.  
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case arising during World War II.62 The Rasul detainees, unlike 
the Eisentrager detainees, had been detained for over two years 
in territory subject to the United States’ exclusive control and 
jurisdiction, without receiving access to counsel and without 
having been charged with any crime.63 Nonetheless, the Rasul 
Court emphasized that the outcome determinative facts 
(relating to confinement) in Eisentrager64 only bore on the issue 
of whether the detainees were constitutionally (as opposed to 
statutorily) entitled to seek habeas relief.65 
More essential to the resolution of the current dispute 
was Braden v. Circuit Court of Kentucky, which postdated 
Eisentrager.66 Since Braden, “the prisoner’s presence within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the district court [had] not [been] ‘an 
invariable prerequisite’ to the exercise of district court 
jurisdiction under the federal habeas statute.”67 Satisfying the 
  
 62 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 765-66. According to the Rasul Court, the 
Eisentrager Court considered the following facts critical to its conclusion that the 
detainees in that case were not “constitutionally entitled” to pursue habeas relief: that 
each detainee was  
(a) . . . an enemy alien; (b) ha[d] never been . . . in the United States; (c) was 
captured outside of [United States] territory and there held in military 
custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by a Military 
Commission sitting outside the United States[] (e) for offenses against laws of 
war committed outside the United States; (f) and [was] at all times 
imprisoned outside the United States. 
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475-76 (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777). 
 63 Id. at 476. The Court also noted that the Rasul detainees were “not 
nationals of countries at war with the United States, and they den[ied] that they ha[d] 
engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against the United States . . . .” Id.  
 64 See supra note 62.  
 65 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 476 (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S at 777); see also Pope, 
supra note 58, at 26 (“[T]he Court characterized Eisentrager as a case considering the 
constitutional parameters of habeas corpus and not the statutory question that was 
presented in Rasul.”) (footnote omitted). Eisentrager concluded, however, that the 
detainees did not have a statutory right to pursue habeas relief because the habeas 
statute, as that Court had interpreted it, required that the district court reviewing the 
habeas petition have jurisdiction over the petitioners. Eisentrager, 339 U.S at 777-78. 
Yet the Rasul Court concluded that the current case was controlled not by Eisentrager, 
but by the more recent case, Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 
495 (1973), which had effectively “overruled the statutory predicate to Eisentrager’s 
holding.” Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478-79.  
 66 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478-79; Braden, 410 U.S. at 495. 
 67 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478 (quoting Braden, 410 U.S. at 495); see also Fallon & 
Meltzer, supra note 58, at 2051 (describing Braden as an example of the application by 
the Supreme Court of the common law, as opposed to agency, approach to habeas 
jurisdiction, whereby a relatively dynamic statutory interpretation was afforded “not 
only to avoid constitutional difficulties, but also simply to achieve sensible results in 
circumstances that Congress might not have foreseen”). 
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habeas statute instead depended on whether the district court 
could reach petitioners’ custodians by service of process.68 
In the current case, no party contended that the 
petitioners’ custodians were not subject to the jurisdiction of 
the District Court for the District of Columbia.69 Pleading 
requirements, moreover, had been satisfied.70 The federal 
habeas statute, as the Court interpreted it, required “nothing 
more” before a district court could entertain this case.71 
C. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld: The Third Post-9/11 Detainee 
Challenge 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld addressed not a jurisdictional issue, 
as did Padilla v. Rumsfeld72 and Rasul v. Bush,73 but the 
legality of a detainee’s confinement under the Authorization for 
Use of Military Force (“AUMF”).74 In addressing the merits of 
the habeas challenge, a plurality of the Court supported an 
approach whereby legal determinations turned on the 
circumstances of confinement as of the time of judicial review 
and not on speculations, even if fairly reasonable, about future 
conditions.75 This relatively limited temporal vantage point 
  
 68 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478-79. 
 69 Id. at 483. 
 70 Id. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.  
 71 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483-84. The Court further held that the principle that a 
statute should be presumed to not have extraterritorial application did not apply to an 
area over which the United States exercised complete and exclusive (though not 
necessarily sovereign) control. Id. at 480 (citing Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 
281, 285 (1949)). Moreover, according to the Court, the habeas statute did not make 
any distinctions based on citizenship or lack thereof. Id. at 481.  
 72 See supra Part I.A. 
 73 See supra Part I.B. 
 74 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516-24 (2004). The legality of Hamdi’s 
detention under the AUMF is not a threshold issue in the same way that the issues 
described in the other three post-9/11, war-on-terror detainee challenges are. (In 
Padilla, Rasul, and Hamdan, the respective threshold issues had to be resolved in a 
particular manner—namely, in a manner favorable for the detainee—in order for 
review on the merits to proceed). In terms of resolution, this legality issue logically 
preceded that of the judicial access owed to Hamdi (since this latter issue seemingly 
would not be reached if Hamdi could not be lawfully detained in the first place), but 
really was a merits-based determination in its own right. Yet inextricably linked to this 
determination of the legality of the AUMF were determinations of the proper temporal 
vantage point from which to assess this issue and, more simply, the extent to which to 
consider the merits of this challenge. Thus, at least to some extent, it may be 
appropriate (beyond merely convenient) to describe these underlying determinations as 
threshold considerations.  
 75 Put another way, prospects, even if unprecedented in nature and even if 
likely to occur, generally should not be considered justiciable if they have not yet been 
substantially developed or realized. See infra Part III.A.  
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resembled in certain ways the winnowing-down method 
endorsed by Padilla v. Rumsfeld (though with regard to 
jurisdictional requirements),76 but differed substantively from 
the more expansive analytical framework employed later in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.77 
1. The Facts of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
In Hamdi, the Court reviewed the claims of Yaser Esam 
Hamdi, an American citizen accused of fighting alongside the 
Taliban following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in late 
2001.78 Hamdi was captured by the Northern Alliance soon 
after the United States invaded.79 He was eventually turned 
over to the U.S. military and transferred to the Guantanamo 
Bay naval base.80 In April 2002, after learning that Hamdi was 
an American citizen, the government relocated him to a naval 
brig in Virginia.81 
In June 2002, Hamdi’s father filed a habeas petition on 
behalf of his son, alleging that Hamdi had been held without 
access to any meaningful judicial process and had not been 
charged with any crime, in violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.82 The various 
forms of relief sought included release from custody, access to 
counsel, and permission to challenge Hamdi’s designation as an 
enemy combatant.83 
2. The Holdings of the Hamdi Court 
The Hamdi Court did not produce a majority; Justice 
O’Connor authored the plurality opinion.84 The plurality held 
  
 76 See infra Part II.A. 
 77 See infra Part III.B. 
 78 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. By the time the Supreme Court heard this case, Hamdi had been 
transferred to a military brig in South Carolina. Id. 
 82 Id. at 511. In other documents, Hamdi’s father claimed that his son had 
traveled to Afghanistan to do relief work and had only been there for two months prior 
to 9/11, but became trapped there during hostilities following 9/11 due to his youthful 
inexperience. (He was only twenty at the time.) Id. at 511-12. 
 83 Id. at 511. For a summary of the complicated procedural history of Hamdi, 
see James B. Anderson, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld: Judicious Balancing at the Intersection of 
the Executive’s Power to Detain and the Citizen-Detainee’s Right to Due Process, 95 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 689, 695-97 (2005). 
 84 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 508. 
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that Congress, through the AUMF, had authorized the 
detention of American citizens held in the United States whom 
the government had designated as enemy combatants.85 But 
the plurality also held that such citizen-detainees, in 
accordance with constitutional due process, must be provided 
with a meaningful opportunity, beyond the “some evidence” 
standard, to challenge the factual basis of their designation as 
enemy combatants before a neutral adjudicator.86 The Court 
remanded the case for further proceedings.87 
The latter holding, though vague, had significant 
consequences for detainees,88 but this Note will only focus on 
  
 85 Id. at 518. This conclusion technically constituted a holding of the Court, 
since Thomas, notwithstanding that he dissented, “agree[d] with the plurality that . . . 
Congress [through the AUMF] ha[d] authorized the President” to “detain those arrayed 
against our troops . . . .” Id. at 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Rotunda, supra 
note 44, at 15, 28 (explaining how under the circumstances “it [made] sense to treat 
O’Connor’s resolution as a workable holding of the Court”). Additionally, in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld (the subsequent detainee challenge arising from the war on terror), the Court 
assumed, citing Hamdi, “that the AUMF activated the President’s war powers, and 
that those powers include the authority to convene military commissions in 
appropriate circumstances.” 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775 (2006) (citations omitted) (referring 
to Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518). But see infra notes 109-114 and accompanying text.  
 86 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533, 537 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). As two other 
members of the Court concurred with the plurality on this point, it constituted a 
holding of the Court. Id. at 553 (Souter, J., concurring in part). But the concurrence 
disagreed with the plurality’s conclusion that the due process required under the 
circumstances was significantly less than that required in the context of the civilian 
criminal justice system. Id. at 553-54 (referring to id. at 534-35 (O’Connor, J., plurality 
opinion)). The plurality concluded, for example, that a federal court could abide by a 
rebuttable presumption that favored evidence presented by the government. Id. at 534. 
Hearsay evidence, moreover, could be deemed admissible. Id.; see also id. at 538 
(noting the “possibility that the standards we [the plurality] articulated could be met 
by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal”).  
 87 Id. at 539. For a discussion of the concurring and dissenting opinions (of 
which the most interesting is that of Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens), see 
Jared Perkins, Note and Comment, Habeas Corpus in the War Against Terrorism: 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Citizen Enemy Combatant, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 437, 451-55 
(2005). 
  In October 2004, the government, rather than face further judicial 
proceedings, released Hamdi from custody and deported him to Saudi Arabia upon the 
stipulation that Hamdi renounce his citizenship and agree to several other conditions. 
CNN-World, Hamdi Voices Innocence, Joy About Reunion, CNN.com, Oct. 14, 2004, 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/10/14/hamdi/.  
 88 In response to Hamdi (see supra note 86 and accompanying text), the 
government convened Combatant Status Review Tribunals (“CSRTs”) to determine 
whether persons detained at Guantanamo Bay were enemy combatants. See Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunals, July 7, 
2004, http://www.dod.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf; David B. Rivkin Jr. & 
Lee A. Casey, How the System Works; Fact and Fiction on Enemy Combatants, WASH. 
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, at A21; see also Robert A. Peal, Special Project Note, Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals and the Unique Nature of the War on Terror, 58 VAND. L. REV. 
1629, 1650-54 (2005) (discussing CSRT procedures). These tribunals have faced 
considerable criticism. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their 
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the first holding. The plurality basically concluded that, 
consistent with the traditional law of war, the “necessary and 
appropriate force” authorized by the AUMF included the 
detention of enemy combatants.89 Because hostilities were 
ongoing in Afghanistan,90 Hamdi’s continued detention could be 
justified even if his detention had no foreseeable endpoint and 
feasibly could last for the rest of his life.91 
D. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Fourth Post-9/11 Detainee 
Challenge 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the fourth detainee challenge 
heard by the Supreme Court following 9/11, ended on more 
than one note of inconsistency with respect to the preceding 
jurisprudence.92 Unlike the plurality in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the 
Hamdan Court did not refrain from reviewing the legality of 
circumstances that were fairly anticipated but that had not yet 
occurred.93 Similarly, contrary to the logic of Rumsfeld v. 
Padilla94 but in part reflecting that of Rasul v. Bush,95 the 
Court seemed to collapse its perception of the strong merits of 
the case (as well as its public importance) into threshold 
determinations prerequisite to review on the merits.96 
  
Day, But Hardly in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2004, at A1 (“Critics have complained 
that the tribunals are fatally flawed, not only because the detainees do not have 
lawyers but because they are generally hampered in disputing any charges because 
they are not allowed to see most of the evidence against them because it is classified.”); 
Joseph Blocher, Comment, Combatant Status Review Tribunals: Flawed Answers to the 
Wrong Question, 116 YALE L.J. 667, 670 (2006) (CSRTs are not in compliance with 
Geneva Conventions, because they do not determine POW status of detainees); see also 
Mark Huband, Dock of the Bay, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 11, 2004, at 16 (account of 
journalist permitted to attend tribunal hearing). But see Rivkin & Casey, supra 
(arguing that the “current [CSRT] system offers a solid basis for processing enemy 
combatants,” but advocating congressional codification of the system so as to reduce 
political pressure and “judicial second-guessing”).  
 89 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518-19 (quoting AUMF, supra note 38) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 90 See infra notes 200-202 and accompanying text. 
 91 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521. This aspect of the decision will be discussed in 
detail in the analysis section of this Note. See infra Part III.A.  
 92 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
 93 See infra Part III. 
 94 See infra Part II.A.  
 95 See infra Part II.B.  
 96 See infra Part III.B. 
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1. The Facts of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni national, was 
captured by Afghan militias in November 2001 during 
hostilities between the United States and the Taliban.97 The 
U.S. military subsequently obtained custody of Hamdan and, in 
June 2002, relocated him to the American prison in 
Guantanamo Bay.98 In July 2004, pursuant to a 2001 
presidential order authorizing the Secretary of Defense to 
establish military commissions to try suspected terrorists,99 the 
government charged Hamdan with conspiracy to “commit . . . 
offenses triable by military commission.”100 
On July 13, 2004, Hamdan filed a habeas petition “to 
challenge the government’s intended means of prosecuting this 
charge.”101 According to Hamdan, the commission “violate[d] the 
most basic tenets of military and international law, including 
the principle that a defendant must be permitted to see and 
hear the evidence against him.”102 
  
 97 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2759 (2006). 
 98 Id.  
 99 Executive Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) (“Detention, 
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism”).  
 100 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759 (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The charging instrument alleged that from February 1996 to 
November 24, 2001, Hamdan “willfully and knowingly joined an enterprise of persons 
who shared a common criminal purpose and conspired and agreed with [named 
members of al Qaeda] to commit the following offenses triable by military commission: 
attacking civilians; attacking civilian objects; murder by an unprivileged belligerent; 
and terrorism.” Id at 2761 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 101 Id. at 2759. Hamdan originally filed this petition in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Washington, but this court transferred the 
petition to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia after the 
government formally charged Hamdan. Id. at 2761. In the meantime, a CSRT (see 
supra note 88) “convened pursuant to a military order issued on July 7, 2004, decided 
that Hamdan’s continued detention at Guantanamo Bay was warranted because he 
was an enemy combatant.” Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761 (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also infra note 114. At the same time, the military commission set to try 
Hamdan commenced proceedings. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761. 
 102 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759. Hamdan also argued that the conspiracy 
charge had no basis in either federal statutory law or the common law of war. Id.; see 
also infra note 114. For thorough summaries of the lower court decisions and 
underlying facts in this case, see Larissa Eustice, Case Summary, International 
Decision: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
457, 457-75 (2006).  
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2. The Holdings of the Hamdan Court 
The Supreme Court first held that the recently enacted 
Detainee Treatment Act (“DTA”)103 did not preclude the Court’s 
jurisdiction over this claim. Although the Act strips federal 
courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges filed by non-
citizens detained at Guantanamo Bay (except for the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in limited 
circumstances), it did not apply to cases pending at the time of 
its enactment.104 
  
 103 DTA, supra note 61. 
 104 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2769 (finding “nothing absurd about a scheme 
under which pending habeas actions—particularly those . . . that challenge the very 
legitimacy of the tribunals whose judgments Congress would like to have reviewed—
are preserved, and more routine challenges to final decisions rendered by those 
tribunals are carefully channeled to a particular court and through a particular lens of 
review”). While this is a very significant jurisdictional holding, this Note will focus on 
other threshold determinations made by the Court. For more information on this 
holding, see Julia Y. Capozzi, Note, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: A Short-Lived Decision?, 28 
WHITTIER L. REV. 1303, 1307-08, 1321-23 (2007) (stating that the holding was “well-
founded” given that the DTA lacks explicit language indicating that the DTA applies 
“to pending cases arising out of [CSRTs] and military commissions decisions” with 
respect to habeas petitions, and, “[t]hus, the Court was reasonable in holding that 
where Congress omits language from a portion of a statute it means that Congress 
intended to omit that language”) (citations omitted); Michael Greenberger, You Ain’t 
Seen Nothin’ Yet: The Inevitable Post-Hamdan Conflict Between the Supreme Court and 
the Political Branches, 66 MD. L. REV. 805, 809 (noting that habeas bar authors 
“certainly” thought that DTA “clearly applied to cases pending at the time of” its 
passage); Jana Singer, Hamdan as an Assertion of Judicial Power, 66 MD. L. REV. 759, 
761-63 (2007) (stating that the holding “was far from self-evident,” considering 
competing canons and precedents, but noting that the Court avoided complicated 
constitutional analysis). The practical effect of this holding, as noted by a dissenting 
Justice Scalia, would be “to keep the [federal] courts busy for years to come.” See 
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2817-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Burt Neuborne, Spheres 
of Justice: Who Decides? 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1090, 1099 (2006) (“[T]he majority’s 
decision preserve[d] the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts over some six hundred 
habeas corpus petitions from Guantanamo detainees pending on the day the 
jurisdiction-stripping provision became effective.”).  
  Much as Congress responded to Rasul by passing the DTA, see supra note 
61, Congress responded to Hamdan by passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006 
(“MCA”), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17, 2006), which apparently 
supersedes the jurisdictional holding of Hamdan by suspending statutory habeas 
corpus for alien-detainees. See MCA, § 7 (“No court, justice, or judge shall have 
jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on 
behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the 
United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting 
such determination.”). It is beyond the scope of this Note to explore in depth the effect 
of the MCA on habeas jurisdiction and the attendant constitutional implications; 
numerous articles have undertaken such comprehensive examinations. See, e.g., Daniel 
Michael, The Military Commissions Act of 2006, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 473, 473, 477 
(2006) (concluding that the MCA “jurisdiction-stripping provision . . . is inconsistent 
with the reach of constitutional guarantees as they have been defined in cases arising 
from the war on terror,” but noting that the “MCA makes substantial improvements in 
other areas”); Michael C. Dorf, The Orwellian Military Commissions Act of 2006, 5 J. 
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The Court next rejected the government’s contention 
that, even if the Court had jurisdiction to review Hamdan’s 
procedural challenge to the military commission, the Court 
should refrain from doing so in advance of a final outcome of 
pending military proceedings in accordance with a judge-made 
rule espoused in Schlesinger v. Councilman.105 Rather, the 
Court found that immediate review of Hamdan’s procedural 
challenge by a civilian court was warranted in light of the 
  
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 10, 13, 15 (2007) (arguing that the jurisdiction-stripping provision is 
unconstitutional “[a]bsent a valid suspension” of habeas corpus “to the extent that it 
authorizes the government to . . . detain a permanent resident alien residing in [for 
example] New York City, without ever permitting the alien to file a habeas petition”). 
Dorf further states that the MCA presents “a veritable cornucopia of law school 
examination questions,” such as “[u]nder what circumstances, if any, does an alien not 
present in the territory of the United States but held by US authorities have a 
constitutional right” to seek habeas relief in a federal court? Id. (emphasis added); see 
also Michael C. Dorf, Why The Military Commissions Act Is No Moderate Compromise, 
FINDLAW, Oct. 11, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20061011.html (criticizing 
the act for “all but eliminat[ing] access to civilian courts for non-citizens . . . that the 
government, in its nearly unreviewable discretion, determines to be unlawful enemy 
combatants.”); Karen DeYoung, Court Told It Lacks Power in Detainee Cases, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 20, 2006, at A18 (discussing how the statute has been criticized by some 
U.S. Senators because it effectively suspends habeas corpus). 
  Litigation challenging the MCA (some of which involves Hamdan, see infra 
note 114) has been underway since its passage, as would be expected given the 
momentous implications of the Act. On December 5, the Supreme Court began to hear 
oral arguments in Boumediene v. Bush, See The Oyez Project, Boumediene v. Bush: 
Oral Argument, transcript available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/ 
2007_06_1195/argument/; Patti Waldmeir, Detainee Cases Split US Justices, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Dec. 6, 2007, at 8, after reversing its initial denial of 
certiorari to hear this case. See Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (vacating 
Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007) (denying certiorari)). This challenge stems 
from a ruling by the Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, denying the consolidated 
habeas petitions of aliens detained at the Guantanamo Bay naval base. Boumediene v. 
Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007). That court held that federal courts lacked 
jurisdiction in these cases because the jurisdiction-stripping provision of the MCA 
applied to pending cases, id. at 986-88, and because this provision did not amount to an 
unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus. Id. at 988-94. But see Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9, 16 (D.D.C. 2006) (“If and to the extent that the MCA 
operates to make the writ unavailable to a person who is constitutionally entitled to it, 
it must be unconstitutional.”). For more background on this decision,  
see Linda Greenhouse, Legal Battle Resuming on Guantanamo Detainees, N.Y.  
TIMES, Sept. 2 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/02/washington/ 
02scotus.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 (discussing the political and judicial contexts 
surrounding this case); see also Michael, supra, at 481-92 (2007) (referencing the Court 
of Appeals decision in a discussion of the constitutionality of the MCA jurisdiction-
stripping provision). 
 105 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2771 (discussing Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 
U.S. 738 (1975)). According to the Hamdan Court, the dual comity considerations 
underlying the Councilman doctrine—military discipline and respect for the 
congressionally established integrated military court system—were not present here. 
Id. Hamdan was not a member of the armed forces and the military commission set to 
try him was not part of this integrated court system. Id.  
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structural deficiencies of the Executive-established review 
mechanism for the commission decision.106 
Additionally, according to the Court, there were grounds 
for presuming the illegality of the procedures governing the 
military commission.107 In particular, under the commission 
rules, Hamdan could be excluded from participating in his own 
trial.108 
Moving to the merits,109 the Court held that that the 
military commission was not explicitly authorized by the 
AUMF, DTA, or Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”).110 
These congressional enactments, even when read together, at 
most recognize the government’s general right to convene 
military commissions, but they did not apply under the 
particular circumstances.111 In the absence of explicit 
congressional authority, the UCMJ permits trial by military 
commission only if the commission complies with the 
“Constitution and laws, including the law of war.”112 The Court 
held that the military commission in question did not comply 
with the laws of war, including the UCMJ itself, because the 
major deviations from court-martial procedures113 were not 
justified by military necessity.114 
  
 106 Id. at 2771-72 (expedited review warranted in “view of the public 
importance of the questions raised . . . and of the duty which rests on the courts, in 
time of war as well as in time of peace, to preserve unimpaired the constitutional 
safeguards of civil liberty” (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942))). Put another 
way, under the circumstances there should not have been any avoidable delay. See id.; 
see also infra Part III.B.2.a. 
 107 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2788.  
 108 Id. at 2786. Furthermore, admissible evidence encompassed basically 
anything with probative value, including hearsay and unsworn statements. Id. at 2786-
87. These and other reasons for not abstaining will be discussed in greater detail infra 
Part III.B. 
 109 This Note assesses the Court’s holdings on the merits only insofar as they 
influenced or effectively interacted with the threshold determinations regarding 
whether the Court should review on the merits Hamdan’s procedural challenge. 
 110 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774-75 (referring to the AUMF, supra note 38; 
DTA, supra note 61; and UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000)). 
 111 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775. 
 112 Id. at 2775 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 
§ 821 (2000) (“The provisions of this code conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial 
shall not be construed as depriving military commissions . . . of concurrent jurisdiction 
in respect of offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by 
such military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 113 See infra Part III.B.2.a.   
 114 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2792-93; see also infra Part III.B.2.b. For similar 
reasons, the commission did not qualify as a “regularly constituted” court and thus 
violated Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2793, 
2796-97 (referring to Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
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art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention 
POW Treatment]. The Article provides, “In the case of armed conflict not of an 
international character . . . the following acts . . . remain prohibited . . . the passing of 
sentences . . . without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted 
court . . . .” Id., art. 3. This provision is typically referred to as “Common Article 3” as it 
is found in all four of the Geneva Conventions, but for the sake of brevity, the Court 
only cited the third Convention. See id. at 2795 n.59.  
  A plurality of the Court also held that the law of war did not recognize 
conspiracy as a crime. Id. at 2777-78 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). For a discussion of 
the several concurring and dissenting opinions (five in all), see Julia Y. Capozzi, supra 
note 104, at 1315-21; Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and National 
Security: Hamdan and Beyond, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 17-22 (2006). Sunstein even 
“nominate[s] Hamdan as the all-time champion” of divisive Supreme Court opinions. 
Id. at 4.  
  On remand from the Supreme Court, the District Court for the District of 
Columbia confronted the case in the context of the newly enacted MCA. See Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2006); see also supra note 104. The court held that 
Hamdan, now deprived of a statutory basis for seeking habeas relief, Hamdan, 464 F. 
Supp. 2d at 12 (finding “unsuccessful” the argument that the MCA retroactivity 
provision did not apply to the jurisdiction-stripping provision), was not constitutionally 
entitled to the great writ of habeas corpus given his status as an extraterritorially 
located alien-detainee. Hamdan, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 12, 18. For further discussion of 
this decision, see Neil A. Lewis, Judge Sets Back Guantanamo Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 13, 2007, at A32; Greenberger, supra note 104, at 810 n.31; Jordan J. Paust, Above 
the Law: Unlawful Executive Authorizations Regarding Detainee Treatment, Secret 
Renditions, Domestic Spying, and Claims to Unchecked Executive Power, 2007 UTAH L. 
REV. 345, 416 n.208 (2007) (disagreeing with aspects of the court’s analysis). In a later 
proceeding, the Supreme Court declined to hear the “unusual” petition for certiorari of 
Hamdan and fellow detainee, Omar Khadr. Hamdan v. Gates, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 
2007), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2133 (2007); Brief for the Respondents at 1, Hamdan v. 
Gates, 127 S. Ct. 2133 (2007), 2007 WL 965445; see also Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Supreme 
Court Denies Certiorari for Guantanamo Petitions, 23 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 7 
(2007) (discussing the petitioners’ circumstances).  
  In June 2007, a military judge dismissed all military commission (i.e., war 
crimes) charges against Hamdan due to the failure of the CSRT system to classify him 
as an “unlawful” enemy combatant (as opposed to just an “enemy combatant”). 
Editorial, Stuck in Guantanamo, WASH. POST, June 7, 2007, at A26, available at http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/06/AR2007060602302.html. 
Consequently, per the Geneva Conventions, Hamdan was entitled to prisoner of war 
status. See id; see also William Glaberson, Tribunal Complicates Policy on Detainees; 
Guantanamo Judges Dismiss Charges in 2 War-Crimes Cases, INT’L HERALD TRIB., 
June 6, 2007, at 7 (“[Senator Arlen Specter] said it was ‘dead wrong’ for anyone to 
assert that Congress intended to permit prosecution of detainees who had not been 
declared unlawful enemy combatants.”). This ruling highlighted systemic problems 
with the post-9/11 system of detaining and prosecuting suspected terrorists. See id. 
(chief military defense lawyer describing the decision as emphasizing a lack of 
“international legitimacy and legal authority” of the military commission process); see 
also Stuck in Guantanamo, supra (describing possibilities for congressional reform of 
tribunal process and mechanisms of judicial review).   
  The procedural deficiency that prompted this dismissal of charges, 
however, is evidently curable by a determination of unlawful enemy combatant  
status at the military commission level itself. See Josh White, Court Reverses  
Ruling on Detainee, WASH. POST, Sep. 25 2007, at A04, available at http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/24/AR2007092401848.html. 
In a related detainee challenge, a military commission review panel ruled “that 
[commission] trial judges can hear evidence on a detainee’s combatant status and 
therefore can proceed with the trials.” Id. (finding that the trial judge hearing the case 
incorrectly “believed he could not make such a determination of ‘unlawful’ status.”). 
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II. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND JURISDICTION 
One question permeating the Supreme Court’s post-9/11 
war-on-terror jurisprudence is the extent to which federal 
courts should afford special treatment to detainee challenges 
when assessing jurisdictional or other threshold issues. This 
section will address a specific subset of this issue: whether the 
merits of a detainee challenge or exceptional surrounding 
circumstances should be considered in determining whether 
the petitioner has satisfied jurisdictional requirements 
prerequisite to review on these merits. The considerations 
underlying this inquiry relate to those underlying the general 
issue of the proper scope of review for detainee challenges, as 
well as the more specific issue (addressed in Part III) of the 
appropriate temporal vantage point to apply. 
Returning to the focus of this section, a circumspect 
examination might suggest that even challenges to military 
detention by alleged enemy combatants deserve the same 
treatment as other challenges to physical custody, as seen in 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla.115 Bending, twisting, or overriding 
jurisdictional rules to accommodate the resolution of the 
profound substantive issues raised by these challenges could 
lead to rampant forum shopping and thereby diminish judicial 
efficiency.116 Arguably, considerations of judicial economy alone 
do not militate against a more flexible jurisdictional treatment 
when major personal liberties or even human rights are on the 
line. Still, allowing ad hoc exceptions based on the importance 
of a case could turn federal courts into arbiters of a largely 
normative set of criteria—in short, the public interest.117 
In Rasul v. Bush,118 the Court, perhaps searching for 
some middle ground, heeded this notion in a technical sense. 
But, essentially in defiance of the principle of judicial restraint 
(at least as understood by the Padilla Court), the Rasul Court 
  
Pursuant to this authority, in December 2007, a military judge in the Hamdan case 
held that Hamdan is an unlawful enemy combatant and is thereby subject to trial by 
military commission. United States v. Hamdan, On Reconsideration: Ruling on Motion 
to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Military Comm’n, Dec. 19, 2007) (Allred, J.), 
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2007/Hamdan-Jurisdiction%20After% 
20Reconsideration%20Ruling.pdf; Reuters, NYT Bin Laden’s Driver Is Not POW,  
Judge Says, Dec. 20, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/news/news-
guantanamo-hamdan.html.  
 115 See infra Part II.A. 
 116 See infra note 147. 
 117 See infra notes 144-147 and accompanying text. 
 118 542 U.S. 466 (2004).  
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appeared to justify its far-reaching jurisdictional conclusion  
by invoking its perceptions of the substantive worth and 
momentous implications of the underlying detainee 
challenge.119 It is to a more specific discussion of these cases 
that this Note will now turn. 
A.  Rumsfeld v. Padilla: Sticking to the Core 
1. The General Approach of the Padilla Court 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla firmly stands for the proposition 
that federal courts generally should not consider special or 
extraordinary circumstances surrounding a federal habeas 
challenge when determining jurisdictional standing, even of 
alleged enemy combatants detained outside the civilian 
criminal system.120 The general approach that the Padilla 
Court advocated instead may be described as follows: whenever 
possible (as opposed to when subjectively preferable), a 
reviewing court should analyze a habeas challenge in 
accordance with rigid jurisdictional rules derived from the 
relevant habeas statute.121 To elaborate, if the dispute at the 
most reduced factual level, without regard to the equities of the 
case, admits to reasonable interpretation within the traditional 
habeas analysis, then its resolution should proceed accordingly. 
The presence of amenable circumstances, rather than the 
absence of any unusual factors, thus determines the outcome.122 
Departures from this established framework should occur only 
in response to factual incompatibilities between present 
circumstances and the core assumptions—particularly, present 
physical custody in the United States—that informed the 
development of the old rules.123 
  
 119 See infra Part II.B. 
 120 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447-50 (2004). 
 121 See id. 
 122 See id. at 449-50. 
 123 See id. at 435-36. Exceptions to traditional jurisdictional requirements 
potentially could be warranted where the habeas petitioner challenged something other 
than present physical custody, such as reservist status in the armed forces, id. at 438-
39, 449-50, or a term of imprisonment that had not yet commenced, id. at 438-39, or 
where the petitioner, assuming that he was a citizen, was held outside of the United 
States. Id. at 435 n.8, 447 n.16. Deviations likewise could be supported where the 
location of the detainee or the identity of his custodian was unknown, id. at 450 n.18, 
or where the government relocated a detainee following a proper filing of his petition. 
Id. at 440-41. Perhaps even government impropriety, under certain circumstances, 
could justify a departure from the strict jurisdictional rules. See id. at 449 n.17; see also 
infra note 137 and accompanying text. The Court stressed, however, that the existence 
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2. Application of the Traditional Habeas Paradigm to 
the facts of Padilla 
Applying the foregoing logic to the specific dispute, the 
Padilla Court declined to make exceptions to strict, statutorily 
derived jurisdictional rules due to any “undeniably unique” 
circumstances surrounding Padilla’s military detention.124 
These circumstances generally pertained to the war-on-terror 
context in which Padilla’s detention arose.125 The Court 
similarly refused to overlook traditional threshold 
requirements in order to accommodate the profound security-
versus-liberty debate embodied by this detainee challenge.126 As 
the Court reasoned, the outcome of the jurisdictional dispute 
should be controlled not by the relative equities, but by more 
objectively grounded criteria.127 
Directing the jurisdictional inquiry accordingly, the 
dispute found immediate disposition within the traditional 
habeas framework.128 This conclusion obtained despite the 
rapid and ex parte nature of Padilla’s removal from the civilian 
criminal system and despite the arguably unprecedented 
personal involvement of the Secretary of Defense in relocating 
an American citizen from civilian to military confinement.129 
Padilla had challenged his present physical confinement, the 
location of which was known and was obviously within the 
United States.130 The identity of Padilla’s immediate custodian, 
Commander Marr, the person who exercised actual day-to-day 
control over Padilla, likewise had been revealed.131 Moreover, 
the relocation of Padilla to a military facility, although 
government-induced, occurred prior to, not following, the filing 
of the habeas petition.132 Thus, despite the presence of atypical 
  
of certain jurisprudential exceptions to strict, statutorily derived jurisdictional rules 
did not detract from the otherwise applicability of these rules to core challenges like 
Padilla’s, where none of the above potential reasons for departure were present. See 
Padilla, 542 U.S. at 446-47; see also infra notes 128-133 and accompanying text.  
 124 See Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 441 (2004); supra notes 45-48 and accompanying 
text. 
 125 See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 437-38, 441, 447-51. 
 126 See id. at 450-51. 
 127 See id. at 441. 
 128 Id.  
 129 See id. at 440 n.13, 448-49. 
 130 Id. at 441, 446; see also id. at 450, n.18.  
 131 Id. at 450 n.18. 
 132 Id. at 431-32. 
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factors, the case ultimately broke down into the usual 
elements.133 
The Court further reinforced the factual and subjective 
distinctions of the traditional habeas paradigm when 
addressing the issue of alleged government impropriety.134 In 
his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens suggested that the 
Court should proceed as if Padilla’s counsel had filed the 
petition before the removal of Padilla from the Southern 
District of New York—especially when considering that the 
government had quietly, if not secretly, conducted the 
relocation process and had not provided Padilla’s counsel with 
sufficient notice of its intentions.135 But a majority of the Court 
chose not to “indulge” this equity-driven legal fiction, viewing it 
as incompatible with the facts-based traditional approach to 
which the Court instead subscribed.136 
Still, the Padilla Court hinted, albeit in dictum in a 
footnote, that greater flexibility could have been accorded to 
the jurisdictional rules if the evidentiary record had clearly 
established that the government purposely “shrouded . . . in 
secrecy” the relocation process or intended to deceive Padilla’s 
counsel about his client’s whereabouts.137 In any event, 
according to the Court, Padilla’s counsel at the time of filing 
apparently knew, even if only from media sources, about 
Padilla’s removal from the Southern District.138 That the 
Padilla Court considered information obtained in this indirect 
manner and from a non-governmental source as sufficient 
notice exemplifies this Court’s manner of disregarding 
normative viewpoints in arriving at threshold conclusions.139 
Much as the Court considered it more significant that 
Commander Marr exerted immediate control over Padilla than 
that Secretary Rumsfeld had exercised substantial control over 
the relocation process, the fact that Padilla’s counsel knew 
about the relocation prior to filing the habeas petition carried 
  
 133 See id. at 441. 
 134 See id. at 448-49. 
 135 See id. at 458-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 136 See id. at 448-49 (majority opinion). The relative insularity of the Padilla 
Court’s approach bears some resemblance to the temporally restricted, present vantage 
point approach later advanced by a plurality in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. See infra Part 
III.A. Yet it contrasts sharply with that in Rasul v. Bush and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. See 
infra Part III.B. 
 137 See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 449 n.17 (citing Padilla, 542 U.S. at 459 n.3 
(Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 138 See id. at 449 n.17; see also id. at 459 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 139 See id. at 449 n.17 (majority opinion). 
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greater legal relevance than the question of how counsel 
learned (or did not learn) about the relocation. 
3. Rationales of the Padilla Court: Advocating a 
Position of Restraint 
As demonstrated by the application of the traditional 
habeas framework to the specific question presented in Padilla, 
the Padilla Court called for a relatively strict separation 
between the jurisdictional and substantive elements of a 
habeas petition. The Court refused to deviate from the 
jurisdictional conventions of habeas corpus just because the 
merits of the case were extraordinary in nature.140 Instead, to 
contain the sort of merits- or dicta-creep evident in the 
dissenting opinion,141 the Court broadly defined core habeas 
challenges.142 This definition includes any case that sensibly 
can be resolved in accordance with traditional threshold 
requirements. Even cases involving U.S. citizens subject to 
military detainment as part of the war against terror feasibly 
could be considered run of the mill, at least insofar as 
jurisdiction is concerned.143 Thereby, in the majority of cases, 
the relative equities would not come into play until formal 
consideration of the merits. 
A more liberal alternative, or a position of less judicial 
restraint, as espoused by the dissent,144 would force district 
  
 140 See id. at 447-51. 
 141 See infra note 144 and accompanying text. This dissent was a preview for 
the majority opinion to come in Rasul v. Bush. See infra Part II.B. 
 142 See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 447-51. 
 143 See id. at 450-51. 
 144 The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, resoundingly 
disagreed with the majority with respect to the role that the extraordinary 
circumstances surrounding this case should play in determining Padilla’s jurisdictional 
standing. See id. at 465 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent described, in particular, 
how the unprecedented personal involvement of the Secretary of Defense in overseeing 
the removal of Padilla from the civilian criminal system posed “a unique . . . threat to 
the freedom of every American citizen.” Id. at 461. More generally, this case presented 
a profound debate between personal liberties and national securities. Id. at 465. The 
dissent further commented on the dangerous situation presented when a democracy 
resorts to major breaches of basic personal liberties in order to maintain national 
security. See id. Overcoming the “forces of tyranny” requires continual adherence by 
the government to the fundamental values represented by the American flag. Id. In 
light of the exceptionality of this case, the Court had an affirmative duty to review the 
case on the merits, regardless of the ultimate determination at this level. Id. at 465. 
“Special treatment,” as opposed to strict adherence to formalistic rules, thus was 
warranted at least at the threshold jurisdictional level. Id. at 460; see also Padilla v. 
Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1064 (2006) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
(noting that the substantive question raised in Rumsfeld v. Padilla—whether the 
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courts to make “ad hoc determinations as to whether the 
circumstances of a given case are exceptional, special, or 
unusual enough to require departure from the jurisdictional 
rules [the] Court has consistently applied.”145 Bending these 
rules in order to facilitate discussion of the controversies 
engendered by this case would, if anything, cause further 
uncertainty regarding the war on terror, or so the majority 
seemed to imply.146 In sum, prudential considerations prevailed 
over equitable considerations of jurisdiction for war-on-terror 
habeas challenges, where the jurisdictional issues could be 
feasibly resolved within the traditional paradigm.147 
B.  Rasul v. Bush: Veiled Judicial Activism 
1.  The General Approach of the Rasul Court 
In Rasul v. Bush, the Court at least tacitly condoned 
appealing to the merits of a detainee challenge as a means of 
enhancing statutorily derived jurisdictional conclusions.148 The 
Rasul Court, unlike the Padilla Court, effectively conflated the 
jurisdictional and substantive components of the habeas 
challenge with which it was presented.149 But rather than 
disclaiming outright the sort of prudential considerations (and 
corresponding winnowing-down approach) advanced in 
  
“President ha[d] authority to imprison indefinitely a United States citizen arrested on 
United States soil distant from a zone of combat, based on an Executive declaration 
that the citizen was, at the time of his arrest, an enemy combatant . . . [was] a question 
the Court heard, and should have decided, two years ago”). But see Fallon & Meltzer, 
supra note 58, at 2052-53 (arguing that the jurisdictional factors in Padilla were “close 
to equipoise” when “taken in isolation”; considering this and that at least some of the 
Justices who joined the majority may have disagreed with the illegality of Padilla’s 
detention, “postponing resolution” on the matter was not inconsistent with a sensible, 
“common law” approach to habeas jurisdiction). 
 145 See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 450 (majority opinion) (internal quotations 
omitted).  
 146 See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 450-51. 
 147 The Court also emphasized that the traditional jurisdictional rules “serve[] 
the important purpose of preventing forum shopping by habeas petitioners.” Id. at 447. 
In the absence of these rules, “a prisoner could name a high-level supervisory official as 
respondent and then sue that person wherever he is amenable to long-arm jurisdiction. 
The result would be rampant forum shopping, district courts with overlapping 
jurisdiction, and the very inconvenience, expense, and embarrassment Congress [had] 
sought to avoid” through its design of the federal habeas statute. Id. (referring to 28 
U.S.C. § 2241). 
 148 See infra Part II.B.2. 
 149 Recall that Padilla strongly advised against such blending together, even 
with respect to challenges by suspected terrorists. See supra Part II.A.  
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Padilla,150 the Rasul Court proceeded more obliquely. On the 
one hand, the Rasul Court proclaimed to subscribe to a strict 
mode of statutory construction, much as did the Padilla 
Court.151 On the other hand, unlike in Padilla, the Court in 
several instances incorporated into its analysis (albeit 
indirectly) factors relating to the merits of the detainee 
challenge.152 Due to these competing observations, it is difficult 
to discern from Rasul’s specific resolution any coherent 
message regarding special considerations and jurisdictional 
standing. If the Court’s tortuous analysis could be broken down 
into distinct tiers, it could be said that, first, formal statutory 
conclusions were made and, second, these conclusions were 
defended via the substantive attributes of the case. The net 
result was a form of judicial activism that, despite its subtle 
implementation, had far-reaching consequences.153 
2. Incorporating the Merits into the Specific Resolution 
of Rasul 
The Rasul Court, notwithstanding its purportedly 
narrow approach,154 supported its formal jurisdictional holding 
  
 150 See supra Part II.A. 
 151 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 478-79, 483-84 (2004).  
 152 See infra Part II.B.2; see also Pope, supra note 58, at 26-27 (describing 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Rasul). As described by Pope:  
In a biting dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the Rasul majority had done 
great violence both to the habeas statute and to the Eisentrager decision . . . 
[which, in his view] did pass judgment on whether the habeas statute 
granted jurisdiction over the claims of foreign nationals held outside the 
United States. He asserted that the brevity of the Eisentrager court’s analysis 
signified that it was nothing more than an axiomatic proposition that the 
statute failed to reach the Eisentrager detainees. Accordingly, in his view, the 
[Rasul] Court had completely recast precedent in order to reach a more 
palatable result while at the same time appearing to give due deference to 
precedent. This jurisprudence, he argued, was an example of “judicial 
adventurism of the worst sort.”  
Id. at 26-27 (emphasis added) (citing Rasul, 542 U.S. at 488, 490, 493, 506 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)) (criticizing the majority’s “clumsy, countertextual reinterpretation” of the 
habeas statute and attendant precedent as a wholesale “departure from . . . stare 
decisis”).  
 153 See supra notes 58, 61 and accompanying text. For a principled defense of 
Rasul, despite its “shortcomings in explanation,” see generally Fallon & Meltzer, supra 
note 58. Fallon & Meltzer argue that the “specific outcome seems entirely plausible . . . 
within the Common Law Model [of habeas corpus jurisdiction], based on the special 
status of Guantánamo Bay,” over which the United States exercises complete control 
pursuant to a lease agreement. Id. at 2059-60. Moreover, this “modest extension of 
jurisdiction avoided or at least postponed a welter of [constitutional] difficulties.” Id. 
 154 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.  
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by referencing the special circumstances that essentially 
formed the substantive basis of the petitioners’ challenge. 
Factors affecting the merits of the case included that the Rasul 
petitioners (while denying the government’s allegations) had 
been detained for over two years in territory subject to the 
exclusive control and jurisdiction of the United States without 
having received access to counsel and without having been 
charged with any crime.155 The Court concluded, however,  
that the narrow and sole issue in this case—whether “United 
States courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to the 
legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad  
in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at the 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base”156—could be resolved readily 
and solely under the federal habeas statutory framework (that 
is, without resort to constitutional fundamentals),157 and hence 
in a single tier of analysis. Nonetheless, the manner by which 
the Court referred to the merits of the case, and ascribed 
significance to them, suggests an additional tier of analysis 
going well beyond any clear-cut statutory considerations. 
The Court first alluded to the circumstances 
surrounding the confinement of the Rasul detainees when 
distinguishing this case from Johnson v. Eisentrager on 
apparently constitutional grounds.158 But the Court 
subsequently concluded that resolving the present dispute did 
not require making this merits-based distinction, given that it 
did not bear directly, or even indirectly, on the question of 
statutory habeas jurisdiction and given that Eisentrager did 
not bar review of the Rasul detainees’ challenge under the 
federal habeas statute.159 The prominent inclusion of this 
distinction begs the question of the Court’s purpose; whatever 
relevance these circumstances had to this case, the Court failed 
to explain why it introduced them in that particular context 
and manner. If the Court had sought only to make an 
additional point apart from its specific legal conclusion, then 
surely it could have delineated this purpose more clearly. 
Instead, this statement tends to refute the Court’s 
  
 155 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483 n.15 (2004). 
 156 Id. at 470. But see infra notes 166-168 and accompanying text. 
 157 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.  
 158 See Johnson v. Eisentrager 339 U.S. 763 (1950); supra notes 62-65 and 
accompanying text. 
 159 See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.  
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proclamations of narrow judicial review devoid of any 
consideration of the merits.160 
Later in the opinion, as the Court directly recited the 
seemingly ultimate conclusion of the case,161 an accompanying 
footnote stated that the petitioners’ allegations, if true, would 
“unquestionably” demonstrate the illegality of their 
confinement.162 Indeed, this statement pertained to pleading 
requirements (as opposed to the question of the appropriate 
forum or court) and appeared outside of the main body of the 
opinion.163 Still, the Court seemed to invoke the substance of 
the petitioners’ challenge in order to reinforce its formal 
statutory conclusion, especially when viewing the footnote 
statement alongside the earlier treatment of the merits of the 
case vis-à-vis Eisentrager.164 Further supporting this assertion 
is the statement’s textual proximity to the formal statutory 
conclusion of the case. Pleading requirements, moreover, were 
not even at issue.165 
The Court, in a last-ditch effort to infuse viability into 
its formal holding, restated the issue of the case in the final 
paragraph of the opinion as follows: “[w]hat is presently at 
stake is only whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to 
determine the legality of the Executive’s potentially indefinite 
detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of 
wrongdoing.”166 While not unreasonable to expect a bold dictum 
in the concluding paragraph of a high-profile, politically 
charged case such as this, the Court proceeded as if it were 
simply restating the exclusive issue.167 But even assuming that 
the emphasized phrase in the Court’s statement did validly 
  
 160 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.  
 161 See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.  
 162 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483 n.15 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)) (“Petitioners’ 
allegations—that, although they have engaged neither in combat nor in acts of 
terrorism against the United States, they have been held in executive detention for 
more than two years in territory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and 
control of the United States, without access to counsel and without being charged with 
any wrongdoing—unquestionably describe ‘custody in violation of the Constitution or 
laws or treaties of the United States.’”).  
 163 See id.  
 164 See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.  
 165 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
 166 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485 (emphasis added); see also id. at 475 (“The question 
now before us is whether the habeas statute confers a right to judicial review of the 
legality of Executive detention of aliens in a territory over which the United States 
exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, but not ultimate sovereignty.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 167 See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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relate to pleading requirements, this statement did not simply 
restate an issue dealing solely with statutorily conferred 
jurisdiction. To the contrary, the merits of the case crept into 
and served to justify the statutory findings.168 
  
 168 Contrast the Rasul Court’s approach with that advanced by Justice 
Kennedy in his concurring opinion. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485-88 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). Unlike the majority opinion, Kennedy directly viewed the particular case 
“against the backdrop of the constitutional command of the separation of powers” in 
resolving the jurisdictional issue. Id. at 485-86. One special circumstance militating in 
favor of finding that district courts have jurisdiction to hear these claims was that the 
petitioners were being held in an area over which the United States exercised exclusive 
and plenary control. Id. at 487. Another critical factor was that the petitioners were 
being held in “indefinite pretrial detention” when it was not clear that such prolonged 
detention was justified by military exigency. Id. at 488. 
  Kennedy concluded that although “detention without proceedings or trial 
would be justified by military necessity for a matter of weeks,” the rationale for 
prolonged detention due to military exigency loses strength “as the period of detention 
stretches from months to years.” Id. A case-specific approach, according to Kennedy, 
would have avoided the dramatic effect of the majority opinion, which he interpreted as 
granting an automatic right to statutory habeas jurisdiction to persons detained 
outside of the United States. Id.  
  It is worth noting, in the context of judicial decision-making, the 
connection between the particular legal lens (constitutional, legislative, or even 
international) through which a detainee challenge is viewed and the perceived scope or 
consequences of the resolution. As Rotunda points out, “[c]onstitutional rulings cannot 
be overturned by mere legislation,” but “Congress, if it chose to do so, could amend the 
[habeas] statute and go back to the world before the Supreme Court reinterpreted it.” 
Rotunda, supra note 44, at 48. It thus may seem strange that Justice Kennedy 
lamented the tremendous effects of the Rasul majority’s statutory-based conclusion, 
despite the ready possibility of congressional reaction and correction, and instead 
promoted a constitutionally oriented approach. Perhaps this can be reconciled on the 
basis that Kennedy’s balancing test would be very fact specific and therefore avoid or 
delay creating immutable legal principles. 
  Kennedy, in any event, did seem to proceed in a more open and honest 
fashion than the Rasul majority, and his approach would produce, in at least one 
important respect, less drastic results than that adopted by the majority. Nonetheless, 
it is difficult to square the Kennedy approach with that of Padilla, which admonished 
against making ad hoc determinations about the exceptionality or uniqueness of a 
detainee challenge when resolving jurisdictional issues. See supra Part II.A.3; see also 
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 496 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing Kennedy’s balancing test 
approach for “provid[ing] enticing law-school-exam imponderables in an area where 
certainty is called for”). Justice Scalia noted that under the ad hoc test espoused by 
Kennedy, “courts would always have authority to inquire into circumstances of 
confinement,” when making jurisdictional determinations. Id. Among the questions 
reviewing courts would have to address are “When does definite detention become 
indefinite?” and “How much [judicial] process will suffice to stave off jurisdiction?” Id.  
  These criticisms in a more general sense could also describe the approach 
of the Rasul majority, which, as described in this subsection, appeared to commingle 
jurisdictional and substantive considerations.  
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3. Rasul’s Incompatibility with Padilla 
As described above, the Rasul Court surreptitiously 
evaded a path of judicial restraint.169 Rasul, however, did not 
explicitly redefine core habeas petitions, as they had been 
defined in Padilla, to categorically exclude detainee challenges 
characterized by extraordinary circumstances or great legal 
uncertainty.170 Moreover, the oblique connection drawn between 
special circumstances and jurisdictional standing might seem 
to produce only indirect effects—serving, in other words, to 
strengthen or buttress the formal statutory holding. Yet, in 
light of Rasul’s mixed messages, it is difficult to assess the 
stand-alone power of the formal holding. More specifically, the 
merit-based considerations cannot easily be parsed from the 
purportedly strict determinations underlying the technical 
legal conclusions.171 Overall, the zigzagging path of Rasul 
evades meaningful reconciliation with that of the more 
straightforward Padilla. 
Rasul also deviated from the specific rationales 
underlying Padilla, including preventing case-by-case deter-
minations by federal courts as to whether the circumstances 
surrounding a detainee challenge are sufficiently exceptional to 
warrant digressions from traditional jurisdictional rules.172 A 
reviewing court indeed would avoid making such ad hoc 
conclusions in the first or primary tier of analysis (which, 
again, was the only level of analysis explicitly undertaken by 
the Rasul Court), assuming that this analysis entailed only 
strict statutory considerations. But the second or supplemental 
tier of analysis (which was effectively undertaken by the Rasul 
Court, its denials notwithstanding173) would essentially require 
assessing the merits of a habeas challenge to determine 
whether they are special enough, or bear on adequately 
important liberty interests, to justify the first-tier conclusions. 
Yet in actual cases this two-tiered approach would  
not be applied as neatly as has been described here, 
considering that it was not directly enunciated but rather 
implied by Rasul’s obscure reasoning. In practice, the two 
levels of analysis cannot be meaningfully differentiated and 
  
 169 See supra Part II.B.1. 
 170 See supra Part II.A.  
 171 See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text. 
 172 See supra Part II.A.3. 
 173 See supra Part II.B.2. 
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basically would occur simultaneously. Regardless of the exact 
description befitting the Rasul approach, the point remains 
that this approach may condone, at least tacitly, a level of 
complex judicial determination that transcends the rigid limits 
envisioned by Padilla, its more level-headed sister case.174 
Applying this convoluted style may decrease indeterminably 
the level of restraint exercised by a reviewing court because the 
extent of change will not be ascertainable amidst the fuzzy 
reasoning. 
C.  The Resultant Shaky Line of Precedent 
Viewed together, Rumsfeld v. Padilla and Rasul v. Bush 
provide little coherent guidance on the subject of special 
circumstances and jurisdictional standing. Given their 
antagonisms, this pair of cases set the foundation soon after 
9/11 for an unstable line of precedent. In Padilla, the Supreme 
Court applied strict statutory analysis to arrive at its formal 
jurisdictional conclusion.175 By contrast, in Rasul, the Court 
only superficially refrained from considering the merits or the 
exceptional surrounding circumstances of its corresponding 
detainee challenge.176 Consequently, Rasul added a layer of 
perplexity to the Supreme Court’s post-9/11 war-on-terror 
jurisprudence and, in doing so, increased the general tension 
that already engulfed the topic. 
The refusal by a plurality of the Court in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld to review an issue on the basis of a future prospect 
(despite its likelihood of occurrence)177 perhaps to some extent 
mitigates the influence of Rasul and, alongside Padilla, 
reinforces a basic message of restraint. Still, Hamdi could not 
fully overshadow the more expansive analytical framework 
adopted in Rasul and, most recently, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.178 
Nor could Hamdi and Padilla, in combined force, mask the 
overall instability of the jurisprudence. 
  
 174 See supra Part II.A & B.2.    
 175 See supra Part II.A.2. 
 176 See supra Part II.B.2 & B.3. 
 177 See infra Part III.A. 
 178 See infra Part III.B. 
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III.  SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND ANTICIPATORY REVIEW 
Another significant feature of the Supreme Court’s post-
9/11 war-on-terror jurisprudence has been the issue of whether 
federal courts should review detainee challenges that are based 
in substantial part on future prospects or anticipated events. 
The question, in other words, is whether such claims are ripe 
for review given the current factual and legal climates and in 
view of reasonably possible subsequent occurrences. Closely 
tied to this inquiry is whether an expedited form of review is 
warranted given the important, though still developing, 
substantive attributes of a detainee challenge. An affirmative 
answer may require courts to make ad hoc determinations 
about whether and what types of circumstances qualify as 
exceptional—a situation similar to that disfavored by Rumsfeld 
v. Padilla with respect to jurisdictional standing.179 This same 
answer may also necessitate a certain degree of judicial 
guesswork in regard to expected factual as well as legal 
developments, which may be viewed as a lack of restraint, at 
least in a temporal sense. 
This sort of prospective temporal vantage point, given 
its relative uncertainty, was viewed with caution by the 
plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.180 Legal constructs (at 
least in the context of detainee challenges), the plurality 
implied, should develop in tandem with, not in anticipation of, 
events and circumstances.181 In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, by 
contrast, the Court demonstrated a willingness to review the 
legality of government actions before they fully occurred, where 
there were sufficiently grounded reasons to presume the 
illegality of such actions and where major liberty interests or 
traditional judicial protections were at stake.182 At a minimum, 
Hamdan suggested that the importance of a dispute, even 
when not finalized, may override considerations of deference to 
the executive branch.183 This section will examine these cases 
individually as well as in contrast to each other and in relation 
to Padilla and Rasul. 
  
 179 See supra Part II.A.3. 
 180 See infra Part III.A. 
 181 See infra Part III.A. 
 182 See infra Part III.B. 
 183 See infra Part III.B.2.a. 
2008] SUPREME COURT WAR-ON-TERROR JURISPRUDENCE 679 
A.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld: “Temporal” Deference 
1. The General Approach of the Hamdi Plurality 
In a manner comparable to the winnowing-down 
approach endorsed by Padilla v. Rumsfeld,184 the plurality in 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld perceived substantive issues related to the 
legality of detention (as distinct from the level of judicial 
process owed to detainees) from a narrow, temporally restricted 
vantage point.185 The plurality supported the following 
approach: whenever practicable—as opposed to when 
normatively preferable—the resolution of the substantive 
issues of a detainee challenge should turn on the circumstances 
of confinement as they present themselves at the time of 
judicial review, and not on speculations, even if fairly 
reasonable, about future scenarios.186 A dispute likewise should 
  
 184 See supra Part II.A. 
 185 See infra Part III.A.2. 
 186 Compare this approach to that employed by Justice Kennedy in Padilla v. 
Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1062-64 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in denial of certiorari), 
where the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari to review the claims of the 
successor case to Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). See Padilla v. Hanft, 547 
U.S. at 1063. As described by Justice Kennedy, these claims were now premised on 
hypothetical scenarios. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). 
Regardless of whether Padilla’s claims were mooted by the fact that he had received 
the principal relief that he had sought, “prudential considerations” militated against 
reviewing Padilla’s claims when the relief sought would have no practical effect unless 
the government proceeded to remove him, once again, from the civilian criminal 
system. See id. Review thus was not justified where Padilla’s return to military custody 
remained a possibility but was not an actual reality. See id. But see Rotunda, supra 
note 44, at 42 (arguing that “the issue [was] simply not moot” given that, among other 
reasons, Padilla could seek damages if he was “held unconstitutionally for the last 
several years”).  
  Still, the perceived threat that his status or the circumstances of his 
confinement could be changed yet again by the government warranted an expedited 
review by the district court overseeing Padilla’s case, in the event that such threat was 
realized. See Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. at 1064. Because Padilla was receiving the 
relief he had sought and because he was not contesting the lawfulness of his civilian 
detention, resolving the current dispute (as presented by Padilla in his writ of 
certiorari) perhaps required nothing more than for the district court to remain alert 
and attuned to change. See id. By this reasoning, a federal court could defensively 
anticipate future governmental abuses when there is a reasonable prospect of their 
occurrence, but could not respond preemptively.  
  Contrast Justice Kennedy’s reasoning here, id. at 1062-64, as well as that 
of the plurality in Hamdi, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (O’Connor, J., 
plurality opinion), with the dissent of Justice Breyer in Boumediene, Boumediene v. 
Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478, 1479-81 (April 2, 2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari), vacated, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (June 29, 2007) (granting certiorari); see also supra 
note 104. Citing Hamdan, Breyer explained why the Court should not refrain from 
hearing a consolidated set of detainee challenges even if available remedies have not 
yet been exhausted:  
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be resolved in accordance with legal principles as 
conventionally understood, rather than how these principles 
might eventually change to adapt to new factual landscapes, 
such as major military or political developments spurred by the 
war on terror.187 Disposition outside of this traditional law-of-
war paradigm thus may be appropriate when (but not until) 
circumstances have altered such that they are incompatible 
with the expectations that informed the existing legal 
framework, in particular that a war will not endure 
perpetually.188 
2. Application of the Restricted Temporal Vantage  
Point to the Facts of Hamdi 
Applying the foregoing logic to the specific context in 
Hamdi, the plurality assessed from a present factual and legal 
perspective whether the AUMF had authorized the detention of 
an alleged enemy combatant held outside the civilian criminal 
system and who had not been charged with any crimes.189 The 
plurality, accordingly, did not consider the possibility, though 
not “far-fetched,” that Hamdi’s detention might last 
perpetually (that is, for the detainee’s entire life), rather than 
just indefinitely (that is, for an uncertain period of time).190 The 
plurality similarly declined to adjudge the present dispute in 
accordance with some hypothetical legal rubric under which 
the law of war had evolved to accommodate the yet unrealized 
prospect of perpetual detention.191 Invoking a sense of 
  
Here, as in Hamdan, petitioners argue that the tribunals to which they have 
already been subjected were infirm (by, inter alia, denying Petitioners 
counsel and access to evidence). Here, as in Hamdan, petitioners assert that 
these procedural infirmities cannot be corrected by review under the DTA 
which provides for no augmentation of the record on appeal and, as noted 
above, will provide no remedy for any constitutional violation. Here, as in 
Hamdan, petitioners have a compelling interest in assuring in advance that 
the procedures to which they are subject are lawful.  
Boumediene, 127 S. Ct. at 1481 (citations omitted). Finally, Breyer noted that “here, 
unlike Hamdan, the military tribunals in Guantanamo have completed their 
work . . . .” Id. (emphasis in original). With this last statement (especially when read in 
light of Part II of the concurrence), Breyer seems to imply that if expedited review were 
warranted in Hamdan, then, a fortiori, so too would it be here. See id.  
 187 See infra Part III.A.2.  
 188 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (O’Connor, J., plurality 
opinion). 
 189 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516-24 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
 190 See id. at 519-20. 
 191  See id. at 521; infra notes 203-204 and accompanying text.  
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uncertainty regarding both factual and legal developments, the 
plurality thus avoided reviewing the legality of a current 
situation in light of unknown future scenarios. 
In considering whether the AUMF had authorized the 
detention of alleged enemy combatants who had been captured 
abroad during hostilities, the plurality distinguished, as a 
factual matter, between indefinite and perpetual detention.192 
The plurality recognized that longstanding law-of-war 
principles permit the detention of enemy combatants for the 
duration of hostilities but no longer.193 Hence, although Hamdi’s 
detention was indefinite, it was limited definitively by the 
happening of a particular occasion—the endpoint of 
hostilities.194 But the plurality also realized that, due to the 
“unconventional” nature of the war on terror and the 
corresponding possibility that the constituent conflicts could 
last for multiple generations, there was a reasonable prospect 
of effectively permanent detention (which, in terms of duration, 
rose beyond the level of mere uncertainty).195 
Nonetheless, the plurality did not deem this 
indefinite/perpetual distinction relevant to evaluating the 
legality of Hamdi’s detention under matters as they currently 
stood. The “necessary and appropriate force” authorized by the 
AUMF, according to the plurality, fundamentally included the 
traditional law-of-war principle mentioned above.196 Therefore, 
so long as active combat persisted in Afghanistan, as was the 
case when the Court reviewed Hamdi’s habeas petition,197 
durational indefiniteness did not strip a detention of its 
legality.198 By that same measure, the prospect of a detention 
  
 192 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521; see also supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 193 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518-20 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
 194 See id. at 520; see also Rotunda, supra note 44, at 31 (noting that “history 
did not give the ‘Thirty Years War’ that label on year one, or even year 29” and that 
“the ‘Seven Years War,’ or the ‘Seven Days War’ are names that the historians gave to 
these wars after they ended, not when they started”). The foregoing assertion rests on 
the assumption that the government would actually comply with the law of war. 
 195 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519-20 (2004) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion); see also 
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 57, at 2077 (arguing that the notion of executive 
aggrandizement “acquires enhanced resonance when one imagines that an 
extraordinary, emergency-based validation of executive detentions might endure 
throughout a metaphorical war with no currently imaginable end”) (emphasis added). 
 196 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518-19 (“Because detention to prevent a 
combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war . . ., 
Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow 
circumstances considered here.”). 
 197 See infra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 198 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
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enduring in perpetuity did not fall outside the scope of 
authorization provided by the AUMF.199 
Regardless of the probability that Hamdi’s detention 
would last decades or beyond, the fact is that over 13,000 U.S. 
troops remained in Afghanistan at the time of the Court’s 
review.200 This substantial, active military presence easily 
satisfies the definition of hostilities under the traditional law of 
war.201 It follows that Hamdi’s detention, within the proper 
scope of the AUMF, could be directly linked to the ongoing 
state of conflict.202 In sum, even a detention characterized as 
perpetual could be resolved by reference to present 
circumstances and in accordance with longstanding law-of-war 
principles. 
The plurality, however, did suggest that a federal court 
might have occasion to reconsider the legal significance of 
perpetual and even indefinite detention if the war on terror 
proved radically different from the “practical circumstances” on 
which traditional law-of-war principles (and, in turn, the 
“necessary and appropriate force” provision in the AUMF) were 
based.203 But rather than explicitly defining an unprecedented 
conflict, the plurality referred to such a conflict by negative 
example (that is, in terms of what it was not), using the current 
conflict in Afghanistan as an illustration.204 
Again, despite the unconventionality of the conflict in 
Afghanistan and despite the likelihood of the lifelong 
confinement of at least some of the persons detained, the 
plurality firmly held that this conflict should be categorized 
within the conventional law-of-war framework.205 This conflict 
seemed traditional not only inasmuch as that the United States 
  
 199 See id.  
 200 See id. (noting reports of over 13,000, and perhaps as many as 20,000, U.S. 
troops in Afghanistan (citing Pamela Constable, U.S. Launches New Operation in 
Afghanistan, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2004, at A22; General John Abizaid Central 
Command Operations Update Briefing, Dept. of Defense, (Apr. 30, 2004),  available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040430-1402.html)); see also Rotunda, 
supra note 44, at 32 (noting that while it is not clear “when the Afghanistan hostilities . 
. . will end,” it is “certain that they have not yet ended” given the continual military 
activity). 
 201 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
 202 See id.  
 203 See id. (“If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely 
unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that 
understanding may unravel. But that is not the situation we face as of this date.”). 
 204 See id.  
 205 See supra notes 200-202 and accompanying text.  
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maintained a significant troop presence in Afghanistan,206 but 
also in that only a relatively short time had elapsed (less than 
three years) since the American invasion commenced.207 As 
implied by the plurality, this period was insufficient for the law 
of war to have begun to “unravel.”208 It may also be reasonably 
surmised from this opinion that the troop level and time period 
considerations, when taken together, militated against applica-
tion of a modified law-of-war framework, even if either 
consideration alone might not.209 
 
B.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Anticipatory Review 
1. The General Approach of the Hamdan Court 
Unlike the plurality in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld reviewed the merits of a detainee 
challenge notwithstanding that the circumstances at issue had 
not yet fully occurred or developed.210 The Hamdan Court 
followed an approach less temporally prescribed than that in 
Hamdi, whereby the evident strength of the merits of a habeas 
petition, or extraordinary surrounding circumstances, could 
warrant a “peremptory” review on the merits. If there were a 
reasonable basis to presume that the government would not 
afford to an alleged enemy combatant traditional legal and 
judicial protections, the reviewing federal court could take 
preemptive action in the name of the public interest.211 
According to the Hamdan Court, the weighty legal questions 
presented by the claims at issue justified the extension of an 
equitable-like jurisdiction over these claims—or, in a sense, 
infused them with ripeness.212 The Court, however, did not 
always clearly differentiate between formal threshold 
  
 206 See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 207 Hamdi was decided in June 2004, Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507, whereas the 
United States invasion of Afghanistan commenced in October 2001, President George 
W. Bush, Presidential Address to Announce Attacks on Afghanistan (television 
broadcast Oct. 7, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.australianpolitics.com/news/ 
2001/01-10-07.shtml). 
 208 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
 209 But, as John Yoo notes, the plurality did not actually give “any reason why 
[even] after two generations it may be necessary to reconsider the laws of war,” so long 
as “American troops remain engaged in combat.” Yoo, supra note 58, at 583. 
 210 See supra Part III.A. 
 211 See infra Part III.B.2 Contrast this approach with that employed in 
Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006); see also supra note 186. 
 212 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.  
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conclusions and additional non-binding rationales, or between 
the former and ultimate substantive conclusions (that is, on the 
merits). Instead, as with Rasul, the Hamdan Court seemed to 
inject merits and dicta into its preliminary analysis.213 
2.  Anticipatory Review as Applied to the Specific 
Dispute in Hamdan 
Applying the approach described above, the Hamdan 
Court declined to abstain from reviewing Hamdan’s procedural 
challenge to the military commission set to try him in advance 
of a final decision by the commission.214 In rebutting the 
government’s contention that the Court should decline to 
address Hamdan’s procedural challenge even if the Court had 
statutory jurisdiction over this challenge, the Court cited 
several structural and procedural differences between trial by 
military commission and trial by court-martial (and civilian 
court, by extension).215 The Court’s conclusion that this 
challenge was essentially ripe for review on the merits in part 
attested to the substantial likelihood that the commission 
procedures would violate the law.216 In other part, the Court 
appealed to a sense of uncertainty regarding the fate of 
Hamdan and future actions by the commission and executive 
branch.217 Plausible grounds existed, in short, for presuming 
that Hamdan would be denied traditional legal and judicial 
protections. The profound liberty interests ostensibly at stake 
supported the extension of jurisdiction over a dispute involving 
only partially developed circumstances.218 
  
 213 See supra Parts I.D., II.B. 
 214 See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text. 
 215 See infra Part III.B.2.a-b. 
 216 See infra Part III.B.2.b. 
 217 See infra Part III.B.2 
 218 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. For a discussion of a different 
type of “anticipatory” response in the war-on-terror context, see Robert M. Chesney, 
Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated 
Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 427 (2007) (discussing policy implications of recent 
trend of “early stage anticipatory [criminal] prosecution” of suspected terrorists by 
federal government). Chesney notes that “military” alternatives to traditional 
prosecutorial approaches have become less attractive in light of persistent legal 
uncertainty regarding the legality of military detention, related political pressure, and 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan. Id. at 432-33, 433 n.24. The subsequent 
passage of the MCA, however, may mitigate the negative influence of that decision. See 
supra note 104.  
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a. Structural Deficiencies 
In rejecting the argument that abstention was 
warranted in light of comity considerations, the Hamdan Court 
emphasized the significant structural dissimilarities between 
the military commission, a creature of the executive branch, 
and court-martial, a congressional creation.219 In particular, the 
appeals mechanism of convictions by the commission rests not 
with the civilian judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces, as it does with courts-martial, but with a panel 
of “military officers designated by the Secretary of Defense,” 
review of which panel’s decision can “be had only to the 
Secretary of Defense himself, and then, finally, to the 
President.”220 
This Executive-appointed panel, moreover, had been 
formed specifically to review the decisions of commissions set to 
try alleged enemy combatants like Hamdan.221 Review of 
Hamdan’s procedural challenge thus could be subject to 
substantial structural military influence, even if not 
deliberately exerted.222 
According to the Court, the fact that Hamdan (at least 
as matters currently stood) was not automatically entitled to 
habeas review by a civilian court under the DTA further 
militated against abstention on the basis of inter-court or even 
inter-branch comity in this exceptional case.223 
The Court preferred to provide a momentously 
important, though still developing, case with immediate review 
by a civilian court (which, under the circumstances, was the 
Supreme Court itself) rather than to defer to an uncertain 
review by a civilian court following the outcome of the military 
commission or to a potentially compromised executive-branch 
  
 219 See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text. 
 220 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2771 (2006) (citations omitted) 
(citing Dept. of Defense Military Comm’n Order No. 1, § 6(H)(4)-(6) (Mar. 21, 2002) 
(last amended, as of the time of this case, on Aug. 31, 2005)). The Court noted later in 
its opinion that under the DTA the President had full discretion over the timing of the 
final decision of the commission. Id. at 2788. In this way, the Hamdan Court, unlike 
the Hamdi plurality, considered as legally relevant the prospect of uncertainly 
prolonged detention. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 221 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2760.  
 222 See id. at 2771-72. 
 223 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2771. Review of the final decision as such, 
under the DTA, would lie at the discretion of the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit. Id. 
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review.224 In simpler terms, but for the Court’s current review, 
Hamdan’s procedural challenge potentially would go unheard 
or, alternatively, be heard by a less than impartial body. 
The Hamdan Court, as the foregoing discussion 
demonstrates, suggests that the military commission 
implicated vital issues beyond the specific procedural context of 
Hamdan’s challenge,225 including separation of powers and the 
availability of structural judicial protections. Whereas the 
Padilla Court expansively defined the traditional habeas 
framework to include even challenges arising in the war-on-
terror context so as to reduce the judicial docket,226 the Hamdan 
Court narrowly construed the concepts of comity and deference 
to expedite judicial review of (still-developing) cases by Article 
III courts where the executive branch had attempted to 
diminish traditional judicial protections. 
Although the Hamdan Court concluded that the 
Councilman comity doctrine technically did not apply under 
the circumstances,227 it also seemed to conclude that the 
important substantive attributes of the case overrode any 
consideration of inter-court or inter-branch comity.228 As a 
baseline matter, given that Councilman did not apply, the 
latter conclusion (regarding the overriding substantive 
attributes of the case) probably should be viewed as dictum. 
But it is not clear that the formal, technical conclusion has 
stand-alone value apart from the substantive attributes of the 
case, considering the profound significance ascribed to these 
attributes and the manner in which they were emphasized. 
Rather, as in Rasul, the Hamdan Court purported to reach a 
self-contained, uncomplicated threshold conclusion, but 
resorted to the merits of the case to give this formal 
determination appreciable value.229 
b.  Procedural Deficiencies 
As described in the preceding subsection, the Court 
rejected comity considerations as a reason for abstaining from 
reviewing Hamdan’s procedural challenge in advance of a final 
  
 224 See id. at 2771-72. 
 225 See infra Part III.B.2.b. 
 226 See supra Part II.A.3. 
 227 See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text. 
 228 See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text. 
 229 See supra Part II.B.2. 
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determination by the military commission. The Court, in like 
manner, did not abstain from early review on the basis that 
there were no grounds for presuming the illegality of the 
commission procedures prior to the commencement of 
Hamdan’s trial.230 On the contrary, the governing procedures 
not only were described with “particularity” in the government 
order establishing the commission, but some of them already 
had been implemented as of the time of the Court’s review.231 
Both Hamdan and the government, the Court concluded, “ha[d] 
a compelling interest in knowing in advance whether Hamdan 
[could] be tried by a military commission that . . . operate[d] 
free from many of the procedural rules prescribed by Congress 
for courts-martial—rules intended to safeguard the accused 
and ensure the reliability of any conviction.”232 
Indeed, Hamdan alleged that he would be and “already 
ha[d] been,” excluded from his own trial.233 The Court, in a 
sense, justified its anticipatory review of the dispute by virtue 
of the premise that the commission procedures had actively 
informed the current reality of the case. The circumstances 
that Hamdan challenged were not just based on some far-off 
possibility (like perpetual detention as understood by the 
Hamdi plurality).234 
“Another striking feature” of the governing procedures 
noted by the Court was the admissibility of any evidence with 
probative value, as determined by the presiding officer.235 
Admissible evidence could potentially include testimonial 
hearsay, unsworn live testimony and statements, as well as 
coercively induced evidence.236 
These procedural deficiencies can be compared to the 
structural deficiencies of the commission’s review process237 to 
the extent that both contributed to the one-sidedness of the 
military commission in favor of the government. Both types 
also widened the degree of separation between the commissions 
  
 230 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2787-88 (2006). 
 231 Id. at 2788. 
 232 Id. at 2772; see also infra note 236 and accompanying text. 
 233 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2788. Even though any proceedings closed to 
Hamdan would have to be attended by an appointed military counsel, the presiding 
officer at his discretion could forbid this counsel from disclosing to Hamdan the events 
occurring therein. Id. at 2786. 
 234 See supra Part III.A.2. 
 235 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786.  
 236 Id.  
 237 See supra Part III.B.2.a. 
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and courts-martial in terms of judicial access and internal 
protections. 
Yet the Court’s aggressive treatment of the subject of 
the presumption of illegality might give a false impression that 
deviations in the procedures governing military commissions 
from those governing courts-martial were per se illegal. Rather, 
the legality of these deviations turned on whether the 
procedures governing military commissions and courts-martial 
were “uniform insofar as practicable” per the UCMJ.238 
Later, in its formal assessments of the merits of 
Hamdan’s procedural challenge, the Court concluded that the 
government had not satisfied this uniformity requirement 
because it had not adequately demonstrated that it would not 
have been feasible, due to exigencies arising in the theater of 
war, to apply the rules governing trials by courts-martial to 
Hamdan’s trial.239 Viewing the concept of military necessity in a 
strict logistical (as opposed to strategic) sense,240 the Court 
found that it was simply not evident that the government 
would suffer any undue hardship by following the traditional 
rules regarding the admissibility and authentication of 
evidence.241 Similarly, the “jettisoning” of a person’s basic right 
to be present at his own trial was not sufficiently tailored to the 
threat to national security posed by international terrorism.242 
In turn, the Court’s conclusion that grounds existed for 
presuming the illegality of the commission procedures 
depended on this same basic determination (that the 
commission procedures did not comply with the UCMJ 
uniformity requirement). To an appreciable (albeit backward) 
extent, the Hamdan Court thus incorporated in its analysis the 
merits of the case when determining whether to formally 
review these very same merits. Stated differently, in a 
sequentially reverse process, the Court’s ultimate substantive 
holding significantly informed its earlier threshold 
determination. 
Even if such merits-based review could be justified in 
light of Hamdan’s allegation that some of the commission 
  
 238 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (2000) (“All rules 
and regulations made under this article shall be uniform insofar as practicable and 
shall be reported to Congress”)). But see infra note 244 and accompanying text.  
 239 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2792-93.  
 240 See id. at 2792. 
 241 See id.  
 242 See id.  
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procedures had already been implemented, the Court did not 
proceed to limit its substantive review to only those 
procedures.243 Additionally, incorporating the merits of the case 
into the threshold determination perhaps could be justified if 
the correct application of the UCMJ uniformity test had been 
undisputed and unequivocal, which it ostensibly was not, and if 
the Court’s interpretation of this test had been devoid of 
idiosyncrasy, which it likewise was not.244 It is therefore 
difficult to find in Hamdan the sort of meaningful separation 
between threshold and substantive considerations that had 
been championed by the Court in Padilla.245 It instead appears 
that the Hamdan Court, perhaps quietly drawing inspiration 
from Rasul, indirectly sanctioned a form of anticipatory review 
over the merits of this detainee challenge.246 
3. Comparing Hamdan to Hamdi 
With respect to the issue of anticipatory review, the 
relative expansiveness of the Hamdan approach, as described 
above, conflicted in material respects with the more temporally 
restricted vantage point employed by the Hamdi plurality.247 
Whereas the Hamdi plurality settled for a position of judicial 
restraint, the Hamdan Court essentially espoused a breed of 
judicial activism. Hamdan, moreover, justified its expeditious 
review on the basis of resolving the significant legal 
controversies engendered by this case and facilitating closure 
on the subject. By contrast, the Hamdi plurality preferred to 
  
 243 To the contrary, the Court proceeded to assess the legality of the military 
commission as a whole on the basis of select governing procedures. See id. at 2853 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that “[i]f Congress enacted a statute requiring the federal 
district courts to follow a procedure that is unconstitutional, the statute would be 
invalid, but the district courts would not.” By that same logic, even assuming the 
impropriety of some of the commission procedures, “the appropriate remedy is to 
proscribe the use of those particular procedures, not to outlaw the commission[].”).  
 244 Substantial disagreement within the Court itself tends to demonstrate that 
the uniformity test was far from settled waters. See id. at 2842 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“Nothing in the text of Article 36(b) [of the UCMJ] supports the Court’s sweeping 
conclusion that it represents an unprecedented congressional effort to change the 
nature of military commissions . . . to tribunals that must presumptively function like 
courts-martial. . . . The vision of uniformity that motivated the adoption of the 
UCMJ .  . . is nothing more than uniformity across the separate branches of the armed 
services.” (referring to 10 U.S.C. § 836(b))); see also id. at 2852 (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(disagreeing with the Court’s holding that the “military commission is ‘illegal,’ because 
its procedures allegedly do not comply with 10 U.S.C. § 836”).  
 245 See supra Part II.A.  
 246 See supra Part II.B. 
 247 See supra Part III.A. 
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let matters develop more naturally and not to ascribe legal 
significance to presumptions, even if reasonably grounded. 
Still, these cases did not flatly contradict each other, and 
differing contexts may in part explain any divergence. 
Significantly, the Hamdi plurality was confronted with 
a prospect (lifelong detention) that, even if reasonably 
foreseeable, is subject to innumerable military and political 
developments. Reviewing the legality of a detention in light of 
this prospect would require a certain degree of prescience, 
which arguably fell outside the judiciary’s ordinary sphere of 
competence.248 The realization of this prospect, at any rate, 
technically would comply with the traditional law of war 
insofar as the detention tracked continual hostilities.249 The law 
of war could eventually adapt to accommodate novel factual 
circumstances, but, again, the plurality could not predict any 
such changes with legitimate confidence. For similar reasons, 
the Court should not prognosticate with regard to how the law 
might respond to reflect these factual developments, including 
the effective reality of permanent detention, at least not when 
only a relatively short period of time (three years from the 
plurality’s vantage point) had elapsed since the relevant 
military campaign began. 
By contrast, the Hamdan Court stood in a more self-
contained universe, one where the legality of future scenarios 
turned predominantly on a previously established set of 
written instructions, even some that had already been 
implemented. Furthermore, the procedures governing the 
military commission, which the government had documented in 
  
 248 See Yoo, supra note 58, at 590-601. With specific reference to the war on 
terror, Yoo discusses how federal courts, comparatively speaking, are institutionally 
incompetent to address foreign policy disputes at both micro and macro levels. See id. 
According to Yoo, the judiciary, “[r]ather than ask[ing] itself whether it can balance 
security against liberty interests . . . ought to ask itself whether the [political] branches 
could strike a better balance based on more informed judgment.” Id. at 601. In a 
similar vein, several scholars, including Yoo, have envisioned the judicial/political 
power struggle in administrative law (or quasi-administrative law) terms. See, e.g., id. 
at 600-01, 601 n.141 (suggesting that federal courts, in contributing to “terrorism 
policy . . . might adopt the deference afforded to executive agency decision making 
under . . . Chevron” (referring to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842-43 (1984) (courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of facially 
ambiguous or inconclusive controlling statutes))); Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, 
Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1178, 1220-26 (2007) 
(describing Supreme Court’s failure to apply Chevron-like deference or analysis in both 
Hamdi and Hamdan as “a puzzling and important omission”). Indeed, it has become 
rather trendy for an article addressing separation of powers and foreign policy issues to 
make at least one Chevron reference.  
 249 See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text. 
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detail, apparently would not comply with the UCMJ (nor the 
Geneva Conventions) as matters currently stood.250 The Court, 
accordingly, could limit any conjecturing on its part.251 Plus, if 
the Court had declined to act when it did, the detainee 
Hamdan potentially would have been foreclosed from an 
opportunity for a civilian court to review his challenge.252 
Reviewing trial procedures for compliance with a statutory 
requirement, moreover, arguably fell well within the abilities of 
a federal court, even if the government had not yet fully 
implemented those procedures.253 
But even in light of these contextual differences, Hamdi 
and Hamdan at best submit to a partial jurisprudential 
reconciliation with regard to the issue of anticipatory review. 
In particular, Hamdi restricted its analysis to a traditional, 
well-established legal framework,254 whereas Hamdan not only 
adopted an evidently controversial interpretation of a 
complicated military code, but essentially based this 
interpretation on the relative equities of the case.255 The 
differences in these cases thus cannot just be rationalized as 
that in one case but not the other grounds existed to presume 
  
 250 See supra notes 112-114, 238-242 and accompanying text.  
 251 Even still, a viable argument can be made against judicial competency in 
this area given the inextricable, underlying (or even overlying) foreign policy 
considerations. But it is arguable that the Court was at least somewhat more 
competent here than in Hamdi—as previously described—within the meaning of 
“competency” as understood by John Yoo. See supra note 248. 
 252 See supra notes 223-224 and accompanying text. 
 253 Review for compliance with international law perhaps less arguably fell 
within this realm, but such review in this case nonetheless would involve an actual 
document (i.e., the Geneva Conventions) and thus a relatively self-contained vantage 
point from which to proceed.  
  For an interesting discussion of the litigation strategies employed by 
Hamdan’s legal team, see Katyal, supra note 44, at 72-105. For instance, Hamdan’s 
legal team, which included Katyal, sought to emphasize in oral arguments before the 
Supreme Court that striking down the military commission set to try Hamdan would 
only minimally interfere with the Executive Branch, given that no military commission 
trials had taken place in over half a century. Id. at 92-93. The Court thus would only be 
preserving “the status quo,” id. at 93, which, as a practical matter, is generally an 
attractive option. Additionally, Hamdan and similarly situated defendants were being 
detained indefinitely, so there would be no major, immediate change in their statuses 
resulting from a decision striking down the military commissions. Id. Moreover, 
following the Court’s decision, there was always the possibility of congressional (as 
opposed to unilateral Executive) endorsement of a military commission scheme. Id. By 
contrast, legislative correction of a decision favoring the government would not come 
easy due to the likelihood of a presidential veto and the near impossibility of obtaining 
a supermajority vote in the “tight political party environment.” Id. at 95. In sum, there 
was no compelling reason to find for the government, and not finding for Hamdan could 
have detrimental, practically irreversible consequences. 
 254 See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text. 
 255 See supra notes 238-246 and accompanying text. 
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the illegality of a future scenario. To do so trivializes the 
substantively different values and rationales underlying the 
respective determinations in these cases. 
C. A Divided Jurisprudence 
The major discrepancies between the temporal vantage 
points applied by the Hamdi plurality and Hamdan Court 
further added to the inconsistencies in the Supreme Court’s 
post-9/11 war-on-terror jurisprudence. Viewing these cases in 
conjunction with Rumsfeld v. Padilla and Rasul v. Bush, it 
becomes apparent that the Court has struggled to determine 
the extent to which it should review on the merits detainee 
challenges or particular elements thereof. The Padilla Court 
and Hamdi plurality selected a relatively narrow framework 
and favored the accessible over the distant.256 By contrast, the 
Rasul and Hamdan Courts resorted to, or effectively condoned, 
the incorporation of more subjective factors into threshold 
analyses.257 
The overall trend probably leans toward the latter, more 
expansive approach, at least when considering the extent to 
which the Court in Hamdan, the most recent of these detainee 
challenges, appeared to consider the exceptional surrounding 
circumstances in assessing whether and to what extent to 
review this dispute on the merits. But even if this emerging 
trend makes the war-on-terror jurisprudence more predictable 
in one sense, it has occurred in a relatively unstable manner. 
For this reason it is difficult to extract from these trendsetters 
(if Rasul and Hamdan may be labeled as such) any readily 
applicable formulas. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s post-9/11 war-on-terror jurispru-
dence has been characterized by inconsistencies with regard to 
the proper boundary between threshold determinations and the 
substantive attributes of a federal detainee challenge, and also 
with regard to the appropriate scope of the temporal 
perspective from which issues should be assessed. Despite 
these general inconsistencies, the emerging trend, as evidenced 
by Rasul and Hamdan, has favored affording special treatment 
  
 256 See supra Part II.A.  
 257 See supra Parts II.B, III.B. 
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to detainee challenges at the threshold level in light of the 
remarkable surrounding circumstances or the important 
security/liberty debate embodied by these cases.258 But 
providing such treatment necessarily entails normative 
judgment about what constitutes “exceptionality” or 
“profundity.”259 To an extent then, the Court has endorsed the 
role of federal courts as arbiters of the public interest. 
Stated more positively, the Court has placed traditional 
legal and judicial guarantees in a higher realm than 
considerations of military logistics, even prior to formally 
reviewing a detainee challenge on the merits. Yet this 
preference too requires making a distinction between actual 
exigency and mere strategy. This distinction, furthermore, in 
large part turns on the particular circumstances of a detainee 
challenge, such as the duration of the detention and the extent 
and nature of judicial process afforded to detainees. 
Consequently, the important substantive attributes of a 
detainee challenge, as perceived by a court, may militate 
against a finding of military necessity, even against the 
backdrop of the threat of international terrorism.260 From this 
same perspective, the major personal liberties implicated by 
government action may even demand an expedited merits-
based review. 
This author does not doubt the potential societal 
significance inherent to detainee challenges arising from the 
war on terror. Nonetheless, the Court should scale back the 
expansive approach to threshold issues that it adopted in Rasul 
and Hamdan. This approach requires, at a preliminary stage, 
extensive ad hoc determinations regarding the worth of a case. 
The resulting absence of baseline standards contributes to 
uncertainty “in an area where certainty is called for.”261 
But the current situation may be still trickier than this, 
given the relative instability with which the Court, as in Rasul 
and Hamdi, has ascribed to an activist position.262 Indirectly 
considering the momentousness of a detainee challenge when 
determining threshold issues implicates the same basic 
problems described above. If anything, the resulting confusion 
  
 258 See supra Parts II.B, III.B. 
 259 See supra Part II.A.3. 
 260 See supra notes 238-242. 
 261 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 495 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also 
supra note 168. 
 262 See supra Parts II.B, III.B. 
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reflects the practical difficulty of incorporating special 
circumstances into the legal analysis. The terms “merits-creep” 
and “dicta-creep” are perhaps overly simplistic, but they 
concisely describe certain insidious jurisprudential tendencies. 
Clearer judicial analysis in detainee challenges—
without creative synergizing of threshold determinations and 
substantive attributes and without conflation of merits and 
dicta—may in time obviate and replace the language of “creep.” 
Clear statutory language, whose plain meaning avoids 
constitutional concerns, could also help undo the damage left 
by the Court in the first five years following 9/11. But the 
Supreme Court (or, less abstractly, the interpretive methods of 
the individual Justices) is not completely beholden to, but 
rather to some degree transcends, the particular statutory or 
political contexts in which a detainee challenge arises. 
Currently on the Court’s war-on-terror, detainee-
challenge docket is Boumediene v. Bush.263 Will the Court  
turn over a new leaf in the second five years following 9/11, 
opting for a more stable course and straightening out the 
inconsistencies in the process? Unlike the Court in Hamdan,264 
and more like the plurality in Hamdi,265 this author will refrain 




 263 This case actually does appear to be correctly poised for a direct 
constitutional ruling, see supra note 104, though there are probably different ways in 
which such a ruling can be framed. For descriptions of other terrorism-related cases 
that the Court has agreed to hear, see Facts on File, Supreme Court; Cases Accepted of 
Americans Held in Iraq; Other Developments, WORLD NEWS DIGEST, Dec. 13, 2007. 
 264 See supra Part III.B.  
 265 See supra Part III.A.  
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